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BETWEEN LEGITIMACY AND CONTROL: CHALLENGES
AND RECUSALS OF JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
CHIARA GIORGETTI*

INTRODUCTION

International courts and tribunals play an increasingly fundamental role in the maintenance of peace and stability, economic
development, and the protection of human dignity. 1 Indeed, the
cases they hear and resolve originate and touch upon diverse
spheres such as boundary disputes, the use of force, the regulation
of trade and investment, and violations of human rights. 2 With

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School. Member, New
York State and D.C. Bars. J.S.D. 2008, LL.M. 2002, Yale Law School; M.Sc. 1995, London
School ofEconomics;J.D.-equivalent 1994, Bologna University School of Law. The author
is grateful for comments by Susan D. Franck, James Gibson, Ann C. Hodges, Charles C.
Jalloh, Corinna Barrett Lain, Shari Motro, Catherine A. Rogers, and Wendy Collins Perdue. This Article was presented at the Faculty Colloquia at William & Mary Law School
and Florida International University, and the author is grateful for the helpful comments
received there. Parts of this Article were also presented at a workshop on Empirical Perspectives on the Legitimacy of International Investment Tribunals organized by
PluriCourts in Oslo in August 2015, and the author is grateful for all comments received.
Finally, the author is glad to have the opportunity to thank Cassie Powell of Richmond Law
School for her exquisite research assistance and Malcolm Savage, III, also of Richmond
Law School, for his essential help collecting the data related to challenges of judges in
international criminal tribunals. All comments are welcomed at cgiorget@richmond.edu.
1. See generally KJ. Keith, Resolving International Disputes: The Role of Courts, 7 N.Z.
YEARBOOK INT'L L. 255, 260 (2009) (explaining the roles of international courts and the
States' use of them); Karen J. Alter, The Multiple Roles of International Courts and Tribunals:
Enforcement, Dispute Settlement, Constitutional and Administrative Review, in INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAw AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 345 Qeffrey L. Dunoff
& Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013) (explaining the duel role of international courts as protecting and challenging state sovereignty, as the courts gain responsibility and are used more
frequently).
2. For a succinct yet comprehensive overview of the work of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ), see generally Sean Murphy, The International Court ofjustice, in THE RuLES,
PRA=ICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 11 (Chiara
Giorgetti ed., 2012); Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal
Based Approach, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 225, 225-27 (2012) (analyzing the range of international courts and their effectiveness in achieving goals).
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increased visibility and relevance, however, comes increased
scrutiny. 3
More and more, these now plentiful international courts are
seen as effective agents of change, a feature that inevitably carries
many responsibilities. 4 Indeed, observers have focused on issues of
legitimacy, effectiveness, and performance of the dozens of international courts and tribunals that are available to the international
community. 5
Some have said that the international dispute resolution system,
and in particular investor-state arbitration, suffers "a legitimacy crisis," and have called for changes in the system. 6 Others have
framed their demands for legitimacy for international courts and
tribunals within the larger discourse of the legitimacy of international organizations. 7 Scrutiny has highlighted concerns related to
the procedures applied to select8 and remove judges and arbitra3. See generally Cesare Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany, Mapping International
Adjudicative Bodies, the Issues and Players, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION 3 (Cesare Romano, Karen J. Alter, & Yuval Shany eds., 2013) [hereinafter
OXFORD HANDBOOK] (examining legitimacy, effectiveness, quality, and systemic concerns
raised about international courts).
4. See, e.g., Allen Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance
Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT'L AFFAIRS 405 (2006) (recognizing the importance and evolving nature of international courts and other institutions).
5. See, e.g., Faculty of Law, PluriCourts- Centre for the Study of the Legitimate Roles of the
judiciary in the Global Order, UNIV. OsLo, http://wwwJus.uio.no/pluricourts/english/
[https:/ /perma.cc/5GLN-RTJE] (a center of excellence created by the Norwegian government that contains research into the legitimacy concerns and efficiency models for international courts and tribunals) (last visited Oct. 22, 2016); The Danish Research Foundation's
Center of Excellence for International Courts, iCourts, UNIV. COPENHAGEN, http:/ I
jura.ku.dk/icourts/ [https:/ /perma.cc/GW2G-FNUC] (contains research into the legitimacy, causes and effects, and evolution of international legal bodies) (last visited Oct. 22,
2016).
6. Charles N. Brower & Sandie Blanchard, What Is a Meme? The Truth About International Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed By States, 25
CoLUM. J. TRAN'L L. 689, 761-77 (2014); see Amokura Kawhura, Participation of Non-government Organizations in Investment Arbitration as Amici Curiae, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 275, 283-88 (Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Chung & Claire
Balchin eds., 2010); Susan Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1521, 1556,
1584-1610 (2005); Susan Franck, The ICSID Effect?: Considering Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards, 51 VA.J. INT'L L. 825, 914 (2011).
7. See, e.g., KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEw TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW - CouRTS,
POLITICS AND RIGHTS (2014) (exploring the scope and powers of international courts operating around the world); LEGITIMIZING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Dominik Zaum ed.,
2013) (comparing and evaluating the legitimization practices of specific international and
regional organizations).
8. For the author's earlier work on the selection of judges and arbitrators, see Chiara
Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment Arbitration?, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L L.
431 (2014).
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tors as a fundamental principle of due process that contributes to
the independence and perceived legitimacy of members of any
bench or arbitral tribunal. 9
Within this framework, robust and effective challenge procedures for judges and arbitrators become fundamental control
mechanisms, and are important to guarantee the legitimacy of
international courts and tribunals. 10 Indeed, proper challenge
procedures ensure the independence of judges and arbitrators at
all stages of the procedures. They also allow parties an essential
opportunity to raise concerns about any of the decision-makers in
their case. 11
Yet, challenges of judges and arbitrators in international courts
and tribunals is a vastly understudied subject. 12 To correct this
imbalance, this Article makes three novel contributions. First, and
for the first time, it details and compares challenge procedures
across a variety of international courts and tribunals, including
both permanent and ad hoc institutions. Second, it provides
unique data on challenges and provides a detailed analysis of their
outcomes. Third, it makes two concrete recommendations that
should be adopted as baseline requirements to improve and harmonize existing challenge procedures: (1) it proposes that an
external or semi-external institution take decisions on challenges,
9. Mackenzie and Sands, pioneers iµ the systematic study of international courts and
tribunals, assert that 'judicial independence is recognized to be a significant factor in
maintaining the credibility and legitimacy of international courts and tribunals." Ruth
Mackenzie & Phillippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the
International Judge, 44 HARV. J. lNT'L. L. 271, 271 (2003).
10. See Rudiger Wolfrum, Legitimacy in International Law, MAx PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF Pus. lNT L LAw (Mar. 2011), http:/ /opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/
9780199231690 /law-978019923169()..e l 960?rskey=wsTGyM&result=l &prd=EPIL [https:/ /
perma.cc/P38Z-8SVG] (exploring the concept of legitimacy in international law).
11. On the debate between independence and effectiveness of international courts,
see Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L.
REv. 1 (2005) (arguing the no such correlation exists). See Laurence H. Helfer & AnneMarie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and
Yoo, 93 CALIF. L. REv. 899, 902, 955 (2005) (responding to Posner and Yoo and arguing
that the most effective courts are the most independent ones); Yuval Shany, Judicial Independence as an Indicator of International Court Effectiveness: A Goal-Based Approach, in THE Cur.,.
TURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES
251, 253 (Shimon Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth eds., 2012) (suggesting a new, goaloriented approach to assess international judicial effectiveness).
12. See Karin Oellers-Frahm, International Courts and Tribunals, judges and Arbitrators,
MAx PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Pus. lNT L LAw 'l[ 20 (2013) ("[T]he topic [of recusals]
needs more attention with the increasing number of international judges, which will probably lead to an increase in critical situations.").
0

0

208

The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.

[Vol. 49

and (2) it proposes adoption of a common standard of review
based on a reasonable third party observer.
The analysis proceeds as follows: Part I first explains why a comparative analysis of rules from different courts and tribunals is necessary and warranted, and then examines the diverse provisions
applicable to challenge procedures in some of the most important
international courts and tribunals; Part II assesses new empirical
data relating to the number of challenges and the success rate of
challenge procedures under some of those rules, and explains
some of the reasons for those challenges; Part III builds on these
findings and concludes by suggesting ways to strengthen the challenge and recusal rules within the existing procedural systems.
I.

CHALLENGING JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS

Once rare in proceedings of international courts and tribunals,
recently challenges have become more common. 13 Indeed, repeat
appointments and potential personal, professional, and case or
issue conflicts result in more reasons for parties to suspect the possible partiality or lack of independence of an arbitrator or judge. 14
Additionally, tactical or unmeritorious challenges are also on the
rise, and parties use them to delay proceedings, obtain strategic
advantages, and minimize possible disadvantages. 15
13. For example, of the challenges filed under the International Convention for Settlement oflnvestment Disputes (ICSID), all but two were filed after 2001. See KAREL DAELE,
CHALLENGES AND DISQUALIFICATION OF ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 515,
527 (2012) (table of cases); see also Meg Kinnear & Frauke Nitschke, Disqualification of Arbitrators Under the ICSID Convention and Rules, in CHALLENGES AND REcuSALs OF JuDGES AND
ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRJBUNALS 34, 35 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2015);
infra Table 1.
14. Luke A. Sabota, Repeat Arbitrator Appointments in International Investment Disputes, in
CHALLENGES AND REcuSALS OF JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS supra note 13, 293-94; Romain Zamour, Issue Conflicts and the Reasonable Expectation of an Open Mind: The Challenge Decision in Devas v. India and its Impact, in CHALLENGES
AND REcuSALS OF JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS supra
note 13, at 227, 227-28, 243; see, e.g., Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador,
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on the Proposal or Disqualification of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuna (Dec. 13, 2013), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3028.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/3D3Z-XW8A] (arbitrator challenged because,
inter alia, he had been nominated by claimant's counsel eight times). ·
15. See Costantine Partasides, The Art of Selecting the Right Arbitrator, THE LONDON ScH.
OF ECON. & POLITICAL SCIENCE (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/video
AndAudio/ channels/ publicLecturesAndEvents/ player.aspx?id=l 252 [https:/ I perma.cc/
K7CT-7P3Ql (arguing that parties can have four reasons to launch a tactical challenge: to
delay proceedings; send a warning to the challenged arbitrator; drive the arbitrator into
making a mistake and create a reason to challenge; and push the arbitrator to resign).
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Naturally, requesting the removal of a judge or an arbitrator
after their appointment in a specific case is a difficult decision for
counsel. 16 Challenges can create tension between the tribunal and
the parties, between the parties, and within challenged and unchallenged members of a court or tribunal.17 They can also result in
heightened scrutiny of other procedures that occur during the proceeding.18 Even successful challenges sour relations, and all challenges add time to the proceedings. 19
This Part first explains why a comparative study of rules applicable in different courts and tribunals is warranted and necessary. It
then compares and assesses the main rules applicable to challenges
with a specific eye at identifying the different elements that may
strengthen or undermine the legitimacy of the members of international courts and tribunals.
A.

Prolegomena: Comparing Rules from Different Courts

A comparative study on international challenge procedures may
sound far-fetched. 20 Indeed, international courts and tribunals are
16. See GONTHER HORVATH & STEPHAN WILSKE, GUERILLA TACTICS IN INTERNATIONAL
NrnITRATION 8, 15 (2013).
17. See DAELE, supra note 13, at 103 ("[C]hallenging an arbitrator can be a weapon
used by parties who wish to sabotage the arbitration . . . . The later the challenge comes in
the arbitration proceeding, the bigger its potential disruptive effect.").
18. Sometimes this heightened scrutiny results from the process being reviewed twice.
As Daele notes, sometimes parties to the arbitration are free to agree to continue the arbitration while the challenge procedure is pending, which is then reviewed when the tribunal is reconstituted. DAELE, supra note 13, at 102. For example, in Salini v. Jordan, the
parties agreed upon a procedure informally during the challenge process, which was then
reviewed again after the tribunal was reconstituted. See Salini Costruttori S.p.A. & Italstrade S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 'll'I[ 9-10 (Nov.29, 2004), https:/ /icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=casesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC635_En&caseld=C218 [https:/ I
perma.cc/EL62-YXCQJ.
19. DAELE, supra note 13, at 103-05 ("Challenges made at the final stage of the proceeding are potentially the most disruptive because, if upheld and a new arbitrator has to
be appointed as successor, parts of the proceeding may have to be repeated."). Daele goes
on to cite the case of Victor Pey v. Chile, in which Chile challenged the entire tribunal three
weeks before the tribunal was scheduled to meet. Id. at 105. Two new arbitrators reconstituted the tribunal, extending the time period of the issuance of the award by more than
two and a half years. See Victor Pey Casado & President Allende Foundation v. Republic of
Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the
Republic of Chile, 'll 39 (Dec. 18, 2012).
20. See generally Anthea Roberts, Paul B. Stephan, Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Mila Versteeg, Comparative International Law: Framing The Field, 109 AM. J. INT'L L. 467 (2015)
(describing the challenge and framing the new field of comparative international law);
Chiara Giorgetti, Cross-Fertilisation ofProcedural Law Among International Courts and Tribunals:
Methods and Meanings, in PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
(Arman Sarvarian et al. eds., 2015) (comparing various international courts and tribunals).
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distinct institutions with specific jurisdictions and rules of procedure. International courts and tribunals may hear disputes
between states, between individuals and states, or of individual
criminal acts. 21 They pronounce decisions on very diverse matters,
including state responsibility, individual criminal responsibility,
treaty violations, and standard of treatment of foreign investors. 22
However, in the universe of international actors, international
courts and tribunals remain specific and defined actors that share
the common function of adjudicating international disputes. 23
International judicial bodies share other important characteristics,
too. 24 First, they are all created by an international legal instrument, such as a treaty, a U.N. Security Council Resolution, or the
application of a multilateral convention. Second, they apply and
are regulated by international norms and operate in the international legal system, where domestic law is only tangentially relevant,
if at all. 25 Third, judges and arbitrators themselves are international actors and, while exercising their function, must be
detached from any domestic legal system. 26
Courts and tribunals themselves routinely look at each other's
decisions on matters of challenges to finalize and strengthen their
own reasoning on similar matters. 27 Thus, for example, in Prosecutor v. Anto Furundiija, the Appeals Chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (IC1Y)-a tribunal
specially created to hear cases on individual criminal responsibility
for grave violations of international criminal law in the former
Yugoslavia-was required to decide issues of judicial impartiality. 28
To do so, the Appeals Chamber reviewed in detail the decisions on
21. See generally CHIARA GIORGETTI, THE RuLEs, PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CouRTS AND TRIBUNALS (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2012) (discussing the various jurisprudence of international courts).
22. THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 1 (Ruth Mackenzie et al.
eds., 2010).
23. See generally Chiara Giorgetti, International Adjudicative Bodies, in THE OxFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Jacob Cogan et al. eds., forthcoming 2016).
24. See Chiara Giorgetti, Introduction, in THE RULES, PRA=IcE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 1-3 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2012).
25. Id. at 2.
26. See generally Romano, Alter & Shany, supra note 3, at 6-7 (explaining that a defining characteristic of international adjudicative bodies is that they are composed of independent individuals who do not represent any state).
27. See generally Giorgetti, supra note 20, at 224 (discussing how various procedures
and laws are shared across international tribunals).
28. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17 /l-A99, Judgment, ~ 178 (Int'! Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000), http:/ /www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/
acjug/ en/fur-aj00072le.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/CPQ3-3GHZ].
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the issue by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), an
international court tasked with deciding cases on asserted violations of individual human rights by a state in the territory of the
European Council. 29 Specifically, the chamber looked at the interpretation by the ECHR of Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, which provides the right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 3o
The same mechanism occurs in international arbitration. For
example, in a challenge brought in the context of an inter-state
litigation between the United Kingdom and Mauritius, the arbitral
tribunal thought it "advisable" to first compare the law and practice
of courts and tribunals deciding disputes between states, and then
look at the law and practice of other international tribunals dealing with cases between non-state parties or between a state and a
non-state entity. 31 In its thorough analysis, the tribunal reviewed
the rules of the International Court ofJustice (ICJ), the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA), and the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) .32
Thus, it is not only proper, but indeed advisable, to compare the
law and practice among different courts to explore and verify the
establishment of best practices, since the courts themselves compare and assess their own rules in relation to each other. The following Section does just that.
B.

Rules Applicable to Challenge Procedures

There are no uniform rules of procedure applicable to all international judicial proceedings. 33 Quite the contrary-each court
and tribunal has adopted specific rules shaped by the unique needs
and characteristics of the institution. 34 Although these rules are
certainly informed by other existing international procedural
29. See Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, The European Court of Human Rights, in THE
RULES, PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, supra note
21, at 362-63.
30. Prosecutor v. Furund_ija, Case No. IT-95-l 7/l-A99, Judgment, U 181-83.
31. The Republic of Mauritius v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland,
In the Matter of an Arbitration Before an Arbitration Tribunal Constituted Under Annex
VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration), Reasoned Decision on Challenge, ~~ 140-55 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2011), https:/ /www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/l 792 [https:/ /perma.cc/U3BVL3WS].
32. Id.
33. See infra Sections l.B.1-5.
34. See infra Table 1 (Summary of Challenge Procedures).
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rules, the differences are sufficiently important to call for a
detailed institutional analysis.
The rules of procedures relating to challenges in the main international courts and tribunals reviewed below include the rules
applied by the ICJ-the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations-and those applicable in the context of international
investment arbitration, including those used in both United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
and International Convention for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) proceedings. As a useful comparison, the Section
also reviews the rules applied in international criminal courts and
tribunals that have witnessed several challenge proceedings.
1.

The International Court of Justice

The rules and mechanisms to challenge and recuse a judge of
the International Court of Justice found in the ICJ Statute are
unique and mirror those found in the statute of the ICJ's predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice. 35
Article 2 of the ICJ Statute provides that the court should be
comprised of independent judges. 36 Upon taking office, judges
make the solemn declaration to perform their duties and exercise
their powers "impartially and conscientiously." 37 Article 16 prohibits members from exercising any political or administrative function or engaging in another professional occupation. 38 Article 17
further establishes certain instances of relative incompatibility and
mandates judges not to act as "agent, counsel, or advocate in any
case." 39 It also forbids judges from participating in decisions in
cases in which they have "previously taken part as agent, counsel,
or advocate ... or as a member of a national or international court,
... commission of [i]nquiry, or in any other capacity." 40
Should an incompatibility arise, it is for the judges themselves to
raise it first. 41 Indeed, the ICJ Statute relies initially on the selfmonitoring of each judge, and envisages only a subsidiary control
35. See generally Statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice art. 24, 1921
P.C.IJ. 390, http:/ /www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_D/D_Ol_le_edition.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/
DT3H-PSKR] (Article 24 provides procedures for recusal).
36. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 2,June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33
U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
37. Id. art. 20.
38. Id. art. 16.
39. Id. art. 17.
40. Id.
41. Id. art. 24.
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role for the president of the court and ultimately for the court as a
whole. 4 2 Article 24 of the statute provides that "if, for some special
reason, a member of the Court considers he or she should not take
part in the decision of a particular case, he shall so inform the
President." 43 This situation has occurred several times in the history of the court, especially in the initial period of a judge's tenure,
as judges tend to have practiced in front of the court or have had
close interactions with it before their election. 44
Additionally, the president of the ICJ may give notice to a member of the court if, "for some special reason," he or she believes
that the member should not sit in a particular case. 45 There is only
one case in which the president allegedly used this power. 46 If the
member of the court and the president disagree on this, it is the
court as a whole that settles the issue by a decision of all the
judges. 47 The parties can also initiate requests for disqualification. 48 Article 34 of the Rules of the Court provides that any party
may communicate confidentially in writing to the president any
facts that the party considers relevant to the application of Articles
17 and 24 of the ICJ Statute. 49
Requests for removal of a judge are rare. 50 Jn.·the history of the
ICJ only three cases are known: two pertaining to requests for advisory opinions, and only one brought in the context of a conten-

42. Chiara Giorgetti, The Chall,enge and Recusal ofjudges of the International Court ofjustice, in CHALLENGES AND REcuSALS OF JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS, supra note 13, at 3, 17.
43. ICJ Statute, supra note 36, art. 24.
44. See ROBERT KoLB, THE INTERNATIONAL CouRT OF JusTICE 136 (2013); Giorgetti,
supra note 42, at 18 (table of cases).
45. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 24 of the ICJ Statute read as follows:
2. If the President considers that for some special reason one of the members of
the Court should not sit in a particular case, he shall give him notice accordingly.
3. If in any such case the member of the Court and the President disagree, the
matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.
ICJ Statute, supra note 36, arts. 24(2)-(3).
46. Sir Robert Jennings, Article 24, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CouRT OF
JusncE: A COMMENTARY 422, n.27 (Andreas Zimmerman et al. eds., 2006).
47. ICJ Statute, supra note 36, art. 24.
48. Giorgetti, supra note 42, at 27.
49. For the composition of the Court for particular cases, see ICJ Statute, supra note
36, art. 34(2), 2007 I.CJ Acts & Docs. 113.
50. Giorgetti, supra note 42, 28-30.
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tious case. 51 The court rejected each of these requests. 52 In
deciding the three challenges, the court adopted a formalistic
reading of the applicable rules and did not elaborate on what
would amount to reasons for a successful challenge. 53
The most recent and well-developed request relates to the challenge of Judge Elaraby. 54 In Legal Consequence of the Construction of
the Wall in the Occupied Pakstinian Territory, the court was asked by
the U.N. General Assembly to advise on the legality of Israel's construction of a partition wall in the occupied Palestinian territory. 55
During the proceeding, Israel requested that the president of the
court remove the Egyptian judge, Nabil Elaraby, a former senior
diplomat for Egypt. 56 The ICJ dismissed Israel's claims and concluded that there was no violation of Article 17 (2), as Judge
Elaraby had not acted as counsel, agent, or advocate in the case
when he was a diplomat for Egypt, and that comments he made
before becoming a judge had not expressed an opinion on the
case. 57
2.

Rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law

The procedural rules of UNCITRAL (UNCITRAL Rules) are frequently used in international litigation, in both international
investment treaty arbitration and other international disputes,
including the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. 58
Under UNCITRAL Rules, arbitrators may be challenged "if circumstances exist" that give rise to ''.justifiable doubts" as to the
51. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971I.CJ.16, 11 7 (June 21) (finding three judges sitting on the panel
did not need to be recused, as prior actions and statements made while in their prior
positions did not preclude their participation in this case); Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.CJ.
136, 11 8 (July 9), http:/ /www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1533.pdf [https://perma.cc/
33JU-N5D7] (finding concerns raised by parties were not enough to preclude judge);
South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase,
Judgment, 1966 I.CJ. 6 (July 18); see also Giorgetti, supra note 42, at 28-30.
52. Giorgetti, supra note 42, at 28-30.
53. See id. at 32.
54. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Order, 2004 I.CJ. 3, 11 3 (Jan. 30).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Jeremy K Sharpe, Iran-United States Claims Tribuna~ in THE RULES, PRACTICE,
AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, supra note 21, at 557.
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impartiality or independence of an arbitrator. 59 The rules are
more generally worded than those of the ICJ and do not indicate
specific conflicts. 60 The standard of review calls for 'justifiable
doubts," generally interpreted to mean that a reasonable and
informed third party would have justifiable doubts as to the impartiality of the challenged arbitrator. 61 However, a party can only
challenge the arbitrator it appointed for reasons the party learned
after it made the appointment. 6 2
The combination of the justifiable doubts threshold with the fact
that the appointing authority makes challenge decisions, provides
a balanced approach to challenges. Under UNCITRAL Rules, a
party that intends to challenge an arbitrator must send notice of
the challenge within fifteen days after it has been notified of the
appointment of the arbitrator, or within fifteen days after learning
of the circumstances giving rise to the challenge. 63 The notice of
challenge and its reasons are communicated directly to the other
party, the arbitrator who is challenged, and to the other arbitrators. 64 If, within fifteen days from the date of the notice, the parties have not agreed on the challenge or the challenged arbitrator
has not withdrawn, the party making the challenge may further
59. U.N. Comm'n on Int'! Trade Law, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (<IS revised in
2010), art. 12 (Apr. 2011) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules], https:/ /www.uncitral.org/ pelf/ english/ texts/ arbitration/ arb-rules-revised/ arb-rules-revised-2010-e. pelf
[https://perma.cc/RA2Y-G9DD] ("1. Any arbitrator may be challenged if circumstances
exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence.
2. A party may challenge the arbitrator appointed by it only for reasons of which it
becomes aware after the appointment has been made.").
60. See id.
61. For example, the Decision on the Challenge to Mr.J. Christopher Thomas, QC in
Gallo v. Canada was taken under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Gallo v. Government
of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Decision on the Challenge to Mr. J. Christopher Thomas,
QC,, 1 (Oct. 14, 2009), http:/ /italaw.com/documents/Gallo-Canada-Thomas_ChallengeDecision.pelf [https:/ /perma.cc/3XLM-PTM2]. In that case, claimant filed a challenge
after learning that Mr. Thomas' professional situation had changed since his appointment.
Id. , 12. Specifically, Mr. Thomas had agreed to advise Mexico, a non-disputing party
under the North American Free Trade Agreement, on legal matters, which could include
international investment arbitration. Id. , 4. The appointing authority concluded that
from the point of view of a "reasonable and informed third party" there would be justifiable doubts about Mr. Thomas' impartiality and independence as an arbitrator, and
directed him to choose whether to continue to advise Mexico or continue to serve as an
arbitrator. Id. , 36. He resigned a few days after the decision. Elizabeth Whitsitt, Aroitrator
Forced to Choose in NAFI'A Dispute over Thwarted Canadian Garoage Site, INV. TREATY NEWS
(Dec. 4, 2009), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/12/04/arbitrator-forced-to-choose-in-naftadispute-over-thwarted-canadian-garbage-site/ [https:/ /perma.cc/ 45LV-GJCZ].
62. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 59, art. 12(2).
63. Id. art. 13(1).
64. Id. art. 13(2).
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pursue the challenge by seeking, within thirty days from the date of
the challenge notice, a decision on the challenge from the authority who appointed the arbitrator. 65
An analysis of the available case law shows increasing challenges
of arbitrators under these rules. However, challenges are seldom
successful. One example where an arbitrator was successfully
removed following a challenge is JCS v. Argentina. 66 There, the
respondent challenged a claimant-•appointed arbitrator. 67 The
challenge was upheld after the court concluded that there was a
sufficiently serious conflict, because the arbitrator was a partner in
a firm that had concurrent representation in a separate, long-running case against Argentina. 68 Other types of cases that resulted in
challenges include cases of "double-hatting" (where an arbitrator
also acted as counsel in related proceedings) and other conflict of
interest situations.69
3.

Rules of the International Convention for Settlement of
Investment Disputes

Most international investment cases are heard under the International Convention for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID). 7° Challenge procedures under the ICSID rules are
unique. 71 Article 57 of the ICSID Convention provides that a party
65. Id. art. 13(4). See generally Giorgetti, supra note 8, at 449-54 (discussing the eligibility criteria for international arbitrators and possible arbitrator challenges with some reference to UNICITRAL rules).
66. ICS Inspection and Control SeIVices Limited (U.K.) v. Republic of Argentina,
NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Case No. 2010-9, Decision on Challenge to Arbitrator, at 4 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/documents/ICSArbitratorChallenge.pdf
[https:/ /perma.cc/SG4P-85ZS].
67. Id. at 2-4.
68. Id. at 4-5.
69. See, e.g., Gallo v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Case No. 55798, Decision
on the Challenge to Mr. J. Christopher Thomas, QC, at 2-4 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Oct. 14, 2009),
http:/ I www.italaw.com/ documents/ Gallo-Canada-Thomas_ Challenge-Decision_002. pdf
[https:/ /perma.cc/4ZLU-DCBZ] (finding Mr. Thomas must choose between his roles as
arbitrator in the case and advisor to Mexico); Sarah Grimmer, The Determination of Arbitrator
Challenges by the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in CHALLENGES AND
REcusALS OF JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, supra
note 13, at 80.
70. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Dispute Settlement:
Review of Developments in 2015 1, 4, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2016/2 Qune 2016)
("About two [-]thirds of last year's [investor-state dispute settlement] cases were filed with
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), either under the
ICSID Convention [Arbitration] Rules or under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules ... .
Overall, [sixty-two] per cent of all known cases have been filed under the ICSID .... ").
71. See generally James Crawford, Challenges to Arbitrators in ICSID Arbitration, in PRACTISING VIRTUE: INSIDE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 596, 604-06 (2015) (discussing arbitrator
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may propose the disqualification of an arbitrator "on account of
any fact indicating a manifest lack of the qualities" required to be
nominated. 72 The qualities are enumerated in Article 14(1) and
require an arbitrator to be independent and impartial, and to fulfill certain nationality rules.73
In ICSID's practice, the term "manifest" has generally been
strictly applied to mean "'obvious' or 'evident' and highly probable, notjust possible." 74 For example, in ConocoPhilipps Company et
al. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the tribunal rejected the
disqualification proposal of an arbitrator and recalled that ICSID
decisions recognized the above definition of the term "manifest." 75
Indeed, the tribunal imposed a relatively heavy burden on the
party proposing disqualification: the manifest lack of the required

requirements and standard of disqualification under ICSID and suggesting that the threshold for a successful challenge in ICSID appears to be higher than alternative regimes);
Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 13, at 41-50 (introducing the procedural steps to disqualify
an arbitrator under ICSID).
72. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States art. 57, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter
ICSID Convention].
73. Article 14(1) of the ICSID Convention states:
Persons designated to serve on the Panels shall be persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or
finance, who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment. Competence in the field of law shall be of particular importance in the case of persons
on the Panel of Arbitrators.
Id. art. 14(1).
74. ConocoPhillips Company et al. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07 /30, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify L. Yves Fortier, Q.C., Arbitrator, 'll
56 (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0223.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/232P-LSX3].
75. See id. 'll'll 56, 68. Similarly, other ICSID tribunals deciding proposals for the disqualification of members of the arbitral tribunal confirmed that the term "manifest" meant
"obvious" or "evident," and that such a finding would require "obvious evidence" of a state
of mind lacking independence or impartiality. For a well-reasoned explanation and summary, see Compafifa de Aguas de! Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97 /3, Decision on the Challenge to the President of the
Committee, 'll 28 (Oct. 3, 2001) http:/ /www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0208.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YDE-27TE]. The tribunal concluded the
following:
[W]e agree with earlier panels which have had to interpret and apply Article 57
that the mere existence of some professional relationship with a party is not an
automatic basis for disqualification of an arbitrator or Committee member. All
the circumstances need to be considered in order to determine whether the relationship is significant enough to justify entertaining reasonable doubts as to the
capacity of the arbitrator or member to render a decision freely and
independently.
Id.
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qualities to sit as an arbitrator had to appear from objective
evidence. 76
Challenge proposals under ICSID must be filed with the secretary general "promptly" and before the proceedings are declared
closed. 77 The secretary general then transmits the proposal to the
members of the tribunal and notifies the other party. 78 If the challenge relates to a sole arbitrator or the majority of the tribunal, the
file is also transmitted to the chairman of the Administrative Council. 79 The challenged arbitrator is then invited to furnish explanations to the tribunal or the chairman. so
If only one member of the tribunal is challenged, it is for the
remaining two members of the tribunal to decide the challenge. 81
The remaining members of the tribunal thus promptly consider
and vote on the proposal. 82 In contrast, it is for the chairman of
the Administrative Tribunal to decide the challenge if the
challenge pertains to either the sole arbitrator or the majority of
the tribunal, or if the remaining members are equally divided. 83
The chairman decides on the challenge, using his or her best effort
to make a decision within thirty days after he or she has received
the proposal. 84 Pending the decision, the proceedings are suspended.85
The strict threshold required to challenge an arbitrator under
ICSID and that decisions are considered by the tribunal's remain76. ConocoPhillips Company et al. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07 /30, 11 56.
77. Int'! Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, ICSID Convention, Regulations and
Rules: Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), r. 9(1) (2006)
[hereinafter ICSID Arbitration Rules].
78. Id. r. 9(2).
79. Id.
80. Id. r. 9(3).
81. See id. r. 9(4).
82. Id. Note that the recent ICSID decision to disqualify an arbitrator is only the
second successful challenge in ICSID proceedings. The challenge was motivated by the
fact that, inter alia, the arbitrator had been nominated by claimant's counsel eight times.
Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision
on the Proposal or Disqualification of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuna, 11 21 (Dec. 13,
2013), http:/ /www.italaw.com/ sites/ default/files/ case-documents/italaw3028.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/T3PW-Q8ZE]. The challenge on this point was rejected, but the challenge was
subsequently upheld as the ICSID chairman considered that the allegations raised by the
challenged arbitrators about the ethics of counsel manifestly evidenced an appearance of
lack of impartiality. Id. 1I1! 75, 78-80.
83. See ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 77, r. 9(4).
84. Id. r. 9(5).
85. Id. r. 9(6).
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ing members are unique to these tribunals. 86 Significantly, ICSID
tribunals seem recently to have moved from a strict reading of Article 57 to a more refined understanding of "manifest" so as to be
closer to other common challenge rules, including those under
UNCITRAL. 87
4.

The International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda

The establishment of ad hoc and permanent international criminal courts and tribunals marked one of the most important developments of international litigation. 88 Within their statutes and
governing documents, these courts and tribunals included particular selection and challenge procedures. 89
The provisions of the IC1Y and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are similar, but not identical. 90 Per Article 13 of the IC1Y Statute and Article 12 of the ICTR Statute,
judges should be "persons of high moral character, impartiality

86. On this issue, see Noah Rubins & Bernhard Lauterburg, Independence, Impartiality
and Duty of Disclosure in Investment Arbitration, in INVESTMENT AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION-SIMILARITIES AND DIVERGENCES 163 (Christina Knahr et al. eds., 2010), noting the
following:
The ICSID's unique system for adjudicating arbitrator challenges raises interesting questions. Are a challenged arbitrator's colleagues on the tribunal likely to
remove him in light of the personal and professional connections between them?
It would seem that an arbitral institution ... would have more interest than coarbitrators in carefully scrutinizing alleged conflicts of interest, given the systemic
and reputational risks that such conflicts implicate.
87. See supra Section I.B.3. See the new trends in recent decisions in Chiara Giorgetti,
Caratube v. Kazakhstan: For the First Time Two ICSID Arbitrators Uphold Disqualification of Third
Arbitrator, AM. Soc'v INT'L L. INSIGHTS (Sept. 29, 2014), http:/ /www.asil.org/insights/vol
ume/18/issue/22/caratube-v-kazakhstan-first-time-two-icsid-arbitrators-uphold [https:/ I
perma.cc/XF7C-NY3V].
88. See Santiago Villalpando, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia & Robert D. Sloane, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in THE RULES, PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, supra note 21, at 233,
233.
89. See Makane Mbengue, Challenges ofjudges in International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, in CHALLENGES AND REcUSALS OF JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS, supra note 13, at 183, 184.
90. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (IC1Y) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were created by U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 808 (1993) and 955 (1994), respectively. For a review of the procedures, see
id. at 189-201.
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and integrity" 91 who solemnly declare they will discharge their
duties "honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously." 92
Rule 15 of both the IC1Y and ICTR Rules of Procedure details
the applicable procedure for the disqualification of judges. 93
Under Rule 15, a judge may not sit and should withdraw from "any
case in which he has a personal interest or concerning which he
has or has had any association which might affect his impartiality. "94 Any party can, based on these grounds, apply to the chamber's presiding judge for the disqualification of a judge of that
chamber from a trial or appeal. 95 The presiding judge then confers with the judge in question. 96
Two different authorities at the IC1Y and ICTR decide on judicial disqualification. 97 Under IC1Y rules, the presiding judge confers with the challenged judge and then reports to the tribunal's
president. If necessary, following the report of the presiding judge,
the president may appoint a panel of three judges from other
chambers to report to him or her its decision on the merits of the
application. 98 If the decision is upheld, the president assigns
another judge to sit in the place of the disqualified judge. 99
At the ICTR, if after consultation between the presiding judge
and the challenged judge, it is necessary to consider the disqualification request, the Bureau-composed under Rule 23 of the president, the vice-president, and the presid~ng judge of the Trial
Chambers-decides on the disqualification proposal. 100
Numerous challenges to judges based on the alleged lack of
independence and impartiality have been brought in front of both
international criminal tribunals. 101 Notably, the challenge to disqualify Judge Frederik Harhoff was upheld by a chamber of the
91. S.C. Res. 955, Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. SI
RES/955, art. 12 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; S.C. Res. 808, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/25704, art. 13 (1993)
[hereinafter ICTY Statute].
92. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Rules of Procedure and Evidence, r. 14, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.50 (July 8, 2015).
93. Id. r. 15; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (!CTR), Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, r. 15, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.23 (May 15, 2015).
94. ICTR, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 93, r. 15.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.; ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 92, r. 15.
98. ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 92, r. 15.
99. Id.
100. ICTR, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 93, rs. 15, 23.
101. Mbengue, supra note 89, at 184.
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ICTY. 102 In the case of Vojislav Seselj, a Serbian Radical Party
leader, a majority of the chamber found that Judge Harhoff "had
demonstrated an unacceptable appearance of bias in fav[o]r of
conviction" and disqualified him. 103 The chamber's decision was
the result of a defense motion, following the publication of a personal letter that Judge Harhoff wrote to numerous other judges
and friends that was then leaked to the public. 104 The defense
argued, and the chamber agreed, that the letter showed the
judge's bias in the current proceedings. 105
5.

The International Criminal Court

Challenge procedures applicable to the International Criminal
Court (ICC)-the only permanent, treaty-based international criminal tribunal-follow the footprints of those found in the ICTY and
ICTR, but are more detailed and include a binding Code of Judicial Ethics. 106
Article 40 of the ICC Statute requires judges to be "independent
in the performance of their functions." 107 It provides that judges
102. See id.
103. Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Judge
Harhoff disqualified from Seselj case, U.N. Press Release MS/CS/PR1578e (Aug. 29,
2013), http:/ /www.icty.org/ en/press/judge-harhoff-disqualified-seselj-case [https:/ I
perma.cc/NE55-R2YA]. The press release goes on to say the following:
The Majority, Judge Liu dissenting, concluded that by "referring to a 'set practice'
of convicting accused persons without reference to an evaluation of the evidence
in each individual case[,]" Judge Harhoff had demonstrated an unacceptable
appearance of bias. The Chamber also noted in this context that no specific reference to the accused was required to reach the conclusion of an unacceptable
appearance of bias. The Majority, Judge Liu dissenting, further ruled that the
appearance of bias could also be perceived in Judge Harhoffs contention that he
was confronted by a "professional and moral dilemma," which in the view of the
Majority, was a reference to his difficulty in applying the current jurisprudence of
the Tribunal. Judge Frederick Harhoff circulated a private letter to [fifty-six]
people on 6 June 2013. The letter then became publicly available through the
media and [I]ntemet. In the letter, the Judge critici[z]ed a number of recent
Appeals Chamber and Trial Chamber Judgments of the Tribunal and claimed
that the President of the Tribunal was exerting pressure on his colleagues in
deliberations.
Id.
104. See Marko Milanovic, Breaking: Judge Harloff Disqualified from the Seselj Case, EJIL:
TALK! (Aug. 28, 2013), http:/ /www.ejiltalk.org/breakingjudge-harhoff-disqualified-fromthe-seselj-case [https:/ /perma.cc/FTA5-7UQS].
105. Prosecutor v. Vojislav Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Decision on Defence Motion for
Disqualification of Judge Frederik Harhoff and Report to the Vice-President, 'l!'ll 14-15
(Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
seselj/ tdec/ en/130828.pdf [https:/ I perma.cc/E6WY-VFDG].
106. International Criminal Court (ICC), Code of Judicial Ethics, ICC-BD/02-01-05
(Mar. 9, 2005).
107. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 40(1), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute].
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cannot "engage in ... activit[ies that are] likely to interfere with
their judicial functions or to affect confidence in their independence."108 Article 40 also requires judges "to serve on a full-time
basis at the seat of the Court" and to "not engage in any other
occupation of a professional nature." 109 Furthermore, Article 41
provides that "[t]he President may, at the request of a judge,
excuse that judge from the exercise of a function under th [e] Statute," and specifies that "[a] judge shall not participate in any case
in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be doubted on
any ground" including,
inter alia, [if] that judge has previously been involved in any
capacity in that case before the Court or in a related criminal
case at the national level involving the person being investigated
or prosecuted ... or on such other grounds as may be provided
for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.U 0

The ICC's Rules of Procedure and Evidence are probably the
most detailed existing binding procedural rules of any international forum. rn Rule 34 specifies that in addition to the grounds
found in Articles 40 and 41, grounds for disqualification of a judge
include the following:
(a) Personal interest in the case, including a spousal, parental or
other close family, personal or professional relationship, or a
subordinate relationship, with any of the parties;
(b) Involvement, in his or her private capacity, in any legal proceedings initiated prior to his or her involvement in the case, or
initiated by him or her subsequently, in which the person being
investigated or prosecuted was or is an opposing party;
(c) Performance of functions, prior to taking office, during
which he or she could be expected to have formed an opinion
on the case in question, on the parties or on their legal representatives that, objectively, could adversely affect the required
impartiality of the person concerned;
(d) Expression of opinions, through the communications
media, in writing or in public actions, that, objectively, could
adversely affect the required impartiality of the person
concerned. 112

It is for the absolute majority of the judges to decide on issues of
independence and challenges.U 3 Decisions are considered without the participation of the individual judge. In matters relating to
108. Id. art. 40 (2).
109. Id. art. 40(3).
110. Id. art. 41.
111. See ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rs. 23-39, U.N. Doc PCNICC/2000/1/
Add.I (2002) [hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence).
112. Id. r. 34.
113. ICC Statute, supra note 107, art. 40(4).
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challenges, the individual judge can present his or her comments,
but cannot take part in the decision.11 4
Rule 33 further provides that if a judge seeks to be excused from
his or her function, he or she needs to "make a request in writing
to the Presidency," who will treat the request confidentially.us
Finally, Rule 35 states that a judge should make a request to be
excused if he or she has reason to believe that there are grounds
for disqualification, without waiting for a request for disqualification to be made. 11 6
To date, a total of five requests for disqualification in three separate situations have been brought, but all have been rejected.ll 7

II.

WHAT Do THE DATA SHow?

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

oF

CHALLENGE OUTCOMES

The Section above highlights the rules that are most often
applied in resolving challenges of judges and arbitrators in international courts and tribunals. This Section assesses the result of the
challenge requests in different courts and tribunals and elaborates
on the reasons that parties used to bring a motion to challenge.
A.

Empirical Evaluation

In order to properly evaluate challenge procedures, it is necessary to know the outcomes of challenges. Until now, however,
114. See id. arts. 40(4), 41(2) (c).
115. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 111, r. 33 ("1. A judge, the
Prosecutor or a Deputy Prosecutor seeking to be excused from his or her functions shall
make a request in writing to the Presidency, setting out the grounds upon which he or she
should be excused. 2. The Presidency shall treat the request as confidential and shall not
make public the reasons for its decision without the consent of the person concerned.").
116. Id. r. 35.
117. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Urgent Defence Application for the Disqualification of Judge Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi (June 29, 2015), https://www.icccpi.int/ CourtRecords/ CR20 l 5_08830.PD F [h ttps:/ I perma.cc/ SK8C-MJPR]; Prosecutor v.
Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Motion for the Disqualification of Judge C. Van den Wyngaert
(May 30, 2014), https:/ /www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_04535.PDF [https:/ I
perma.cc/QY6H-VAIJ]; Prosecutor v. Combo, ICC-01/05-01/13, Defence Request for the
Disqualification of the Single Judge Curro Tarfusser (May 1, 2014), https:/ /www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_03836.PDF [https:/ /perma.cc/6KPC-Z6SU]; Prosecutor v.
Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Defence Application for the Disqualification of Judge Sang-Hyun
Song (Feb. 20, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_01589.PDF [https:/
/perma.cc/2D92-N6LS]; Prosecutor v. Nourain, ICC-02/05-03/09, Defence Request for
the Disqualification of a Judge (Apr. 2, 2012), https:/ /www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/
CR2012_04486.PDF [https:/ /perma.cc/5U9X-RL24].
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those data were largely missing.us This Article provides the first
collection and analysis of challenge requests across a variety of
important international courts and tribunals.n 9
Table 1, below, shows the number of challenges made under the
procedures in international courts and tribunals analyzed above, as
well as their final outcomes. 120 These data offer multiple interesting insights.
First, they show that, though increasing, challenge procedures
continue to be quite rare. 121 In the entire history of the I CJ-since
1946-only three cases were ever brought to the attention of the
president of the court. 122 International criminal tribunals and the
ICC see a comparably higher number of challenges, but they also
deal with a much higher number of cases and procedures. 123
Second, the data also demonstrate that challenge requests are
very rarely accepted.1 24 No challenge or disqualification request
has ever been upheld in a permanent court such as the ICJ or the
ICC. 125 In fact, although several requests were made in both permanent courts, none has ever been accepted. 1 26
ll8. See Oellers-Frahm, supra note 12, ii. 20 (arguing that "the topic [of judges'
recusals] needs more attention with the increasing number of international judges, which
will probably lead to an increase in critical situations.").
ll9. The data have been collected by the author and are available in her files.
120. An important caveat applies. Because of confidentiality rules, not all cases are
available. At times, even the existence of the case (and thus the challenge) remains completely confidential. At other times, the reasoning of the decision relating to a challenge
remains confidential. Thus, this situation inevitably shows only a partial figure of the total
number of cases. Further, there are still a number of challenges that are pending, so any
data present a picture taken at a certain time. See generally Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note
13, at 34-37 (providing statistical figures of disqualification challenges and cases registered, per year); Grimmer, supra note 69 (showing an overview of various challenges under
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules).
121. For a thorough examination of the difficulties of collecting and interpreting challenge decisions in commercial arbitration, see Catherine A. Rogers & ldil Turner, Arbitrator
Challenges: Too Many Or Not Enough?, in CONTEMPORARY IssuEs IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2014 128, 129-30 (Oct. 2015).
122. See infra Section I.B.l.
123. See infra Section l.B.5.
124. "Recent decisions have reinforced an increasingly widespread belief in the arbitration world that there exists only a remote chance of success when challenging arbitrators
in ICSID proceedings. Indeed, while there have been over [forty] challenges lodged
against sitting ICSID arbitrators since the early 1980s, successfully changing the composition of a tribunal has proven highly problematic in the absence of a voluntary resignation."
Challenges to arbitrators under the ICSID Convention - Increasingly Common but Success remains
Improbable, VOLTERRA FIETTA (Spring 2012), http:/ /www.volterrafietta.com/ challenges-toarbitrators-under-the-icsid-convention-increasingly-common-but-success-remains-improbable/ [https://perma.cc/429A-XD96].
125. See infra Sections l.B.l & l.B.5.
126. See infra Table 1.
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Third, only one challenge has ever been upheld in an international criminal court or tribunal, namely at the IC1Y, in the controversial Seselj case, which was widely discussed in the professional
press. 127 No challenges were ever accepted at the ICTR or ICC,
though many challenge proceedings were initiated. 1 2 8 Similarly,
none of the twenty-two challenges presented at the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal proceedings were upheld. 1 2 9
Interestingly and unexpectedly, as challenge mechanisms in
international arbitration have been deeply criticized, several international arbitrators were removed as a consequence of challenge
procedures under both ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules. 130 Under
the available data for UNCITRAL, 131 of the twenty-eight arbitrator
challenges submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
for determination, seventeen were rejected, seven were upheld,
three resulted in the resignation of the arbitrator, and one was
withdrawn during settlement negotiations. 132 In ICSID arbitration,
eighty-four arbitrators were challenged, resulting in the rejection
of fifty-six requests, the resignation of twenty-one arbitrators, and
the withdrawal or discontinuation of three proposals. 133 Only four
challenges were upheld. 134 Thus, twenty-two percent of the cases
brought to the PCA for determination under UNCITRAL Rules
were upheld, while only about five percent of the cases brought at
ICSID resulted in the acceptance of the challenge. 135

127. See Press Release, supra note 103; see also Milanovic, supra note 104 (showing the
challenge was widely discussed).
128. See infra Section I.B.4.
129. For an in-depth analysis of challenges at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, see Lee M.
Caplan, ArbitratM Challenges at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, in CHALLENGES AND
REcUSALS OF JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, supra
note 13, at 115.
130. See generally Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 13, at 43-46 (providing an overview of
challenges at ICSID including the procedure to bring a challenge); Grimmer, supra note
69 (providing an overview of various challenges under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules).
131. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
132. For more detailed analysis, see Grimmer, supra note 69, at 83.
133. Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 13, at 35-37.
134. Id.
135. See Grimmer, supra note 69, at 83.
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ToTAL NUMBER OF KNoWN CHALLENGE CAsEs PER
INSTITUTION AND THEIR RESULTS

Institution

Number of
Challene:es

Result of Challenges

ICJ136

3 cases challenging
5 iudE!"es

0 challenges upheld

ICSID (as of
84 arbitrators
September 2014) 137

21 arbitrators resigned
3 proposals withdrawn/discontinued
56 declined
4 upheld

lran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal
(UNCITRAL
Rules) 138

0 challenges upheld
3 resigned/proposal withdrawn
9 dismissed on technical grounds (e.g.,
untimely or failure to state reasons)
10 dismissed for failure to establish
I justifiable doubts

22 cases

PCA (1976 and
28 arbitrators (24 in 24 resulted in determination: 17
2010 UNCITRAL
investor-state
challenges rejected and 7 upheld; 3
Rules (as of end of arbitrations)
resulted in the resignation of the
2014) 139
challenged arbitrator; 1 withdrawn in
the context of broader settlement
negotiations
International
5 judges in 3
0 accepted
Criminal Court
situations
IC1Y 140

27 motions in 12
cases 141

1 accepted: challenge of Judge Harhoff
(2013)

ICTR

29 motions in 17
cases 142

0 accepted

136. Giorgetti, supra note 42, at 28-32.
137. Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 13, at 35-37.
138. Caplan, supra note 129, at 121-22.
139. Grimmer, supra note 69, at 82-85.
140. Prosecutor v. Vojislav Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Decision on Defence Motion for
Disqualification of Judge Frederik Harhoff and Report to the Vice-President, 'll'll 14-15
(Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 28, 2013).
141. Note that motions by the same defendant challenging multiple judges and cases
in which challenges were filed by more than one defendant in a case were counted as one
motion. The total number of judges challenged in all the motions is forty-eight; three
entire trial chambers were also challenged. Data on file with the author. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Blagojevia: & Jokia:, Case No. IT-02-60, Challenge of the Judges of Trial
Chamber II (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003); Prosecutor v.
Lukia: & Lukia:, Case No. IT-98-32/1, Challenge of the Trial Chamber (Int'! Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2008); Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15,
Challenge to the Jurisdiction of Trial Chamber I Qune 3, 1999).
142. Note that motions challenging multiple judges by the same defendant and cases
in which challenges were filed by more than one defendant in a case were counted as one.
The total number of judges challenged in all the motions is sixty-eight. Data on file with
the author. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karad_ia:, Case No. IT-95-5/18, Challenge to Judges
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The overall success rate of challenge procedures, however, does
not describe the full picture. In fact, a significant number of
arbitrators preferred to resign from the panel once challenged,
without waiting for the result of the challenge decision. 143 This
may signal different issues, which remain necessarily speculative. 144
Resignation may be the result of a desire of an arbitrator not to
disrupt the proceedings and simply withdraw from a case when one
of the parties has lost trust in him or her. 145 Resignation may also
be the consequence of the arbitrator's perceived likelihood of
success of a legitimate challenge. 146
Another reason that would result in the change of the
composition of the bench includes a self-recusal from the judge
him- or herself prior to challenge. This is the preferred method at
the ICJ, for example, where judges are appointed for nine-year
terms and the cases that they will face are not yet known. 147 A
judge or an arbitrator could also be excused by the appointing
authority before the conclusion of the challenge procedure. For
example, in one of the most colorful stories related to challenges at
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the United States challenged two
judges appointed by Iran after they physically attacked the Swedish
judge in an attempt to remove him from the tribunal's premises. 148
The United States challenged the two attacking judges and Iran
withdrew them shortly thereafter. 149
Thus, if one considers how often challenge of an arbitrator or
judge results in the alteration of the composition of the tribunal
(including the number of resignations of arbitrators), the data
present a more nuanced picture: under the PCA/UNCITRAL
rules, about a third of all the challenges result in a new
composition of judges (nine of twenty-seven), while under ICSID
Kwon, Morrison, Baird & Lattanzi (Int'l Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 2014);
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A, Oral Challenge to Judges Laity Kama and
William Sekule (Dec. 7, 1999); Prosecutor v. Ntabakuze, Case No. ICTR-97-34, Challenge
to the Judges of Trial Chamber III; Judges Williams, Ostrovsky, and Dolenc (Feb. 20,
2002).
143. See Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 13, at 37; Grimmer, supra note 69, at 100.
144. See Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 13, at 37.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. Giorgetti, supra note 42, at 4.
148. See Robert 0. Keohane et al., Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and
Transnational, 54 INT'L. 0RG. 457, 471 (2000); see also Caplan, supra note 129, at 121-35
(addressing challenges at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal).
149. Caplan, supra note 129, at 130.
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the result is a little less than one third (twenty-five of eightyfour) .150
The same observation applies also in the context of other
international courts and tribunals. Indeed, the composition of the
bench of many courts and tribunals has changed as a result of selfrecusals.151 At the ICJ, severaljudges have recused themselves as a
consequence of conflict of interests and past activities; this has also
occurred at the IC1Y and the ICTR. 15 2
B.

R.easons to Challenge

Having discussed above the data available on challenge outcomes, it is also valuable to explore some of the reasons that
prompted challenges. Reasons to challenge vary significantly, and
include both reasons that are pre-existing, such as personal or professional connections and activities, as well as reasons that develop
during the course of the arbitration, mostly involving the handling
of the arbitration procedure. 153
Specifically, some of the reasons that resulted in the initiation of
challenge proceedings include the professional or personal relationship of a judge or arbitrator with a party or counsel, including:
the nomination to governmental post or international organization; the merger of law firms, or the assumption of a partnership or
adviser role; multiple appointments of an arbitrator by the same
party or counsel; financial interest or link to one of the parties; the
presence of a long-standing relationship; the fact that the arbitrator or judge and counsel previously acted as co-counsel; professional contacts between the judge or arbitrator and counsel; family
links between the judge or arbitrator and counsel for a party; personal animosity between a judge or arbitrator and counsel; and
double-hatting. 154
Challenges were also brought for reasons linked to the conduct
of proceedings, 155 including financial dependence, failure to dis150. See Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 13, at 35-37.
151. See Giorgetti, supra note 42, at 17.
152. See KoLB, supra note 44, at 132-37.
153. Grimmer, supra note 69, at 97-104.
154. Id. In a Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) case the respondent challenged
the arbitrator appointed by the claimant on the grounds that the arbitrator's daughter was
employed as an associate at a branch of the law firm representing the claimant. Id. at 104.
The secretary general found that these circumstances satisfied the justifiable doubts test.
Id.
155. Such conduct-based challenges include, especially, Iran's challenges of the presidents of tribunals-seven cases, six of which were dismissed by the appointing authority
(and supported by the United States), with eight challenges total-but more recently also
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close conflict, and improper conduct or behavior during the proceedings, 156 such as disclosure of deliberation, physical assault to
another arbitrator, or failure to act. 1 57
Other reasons for challenges include: statements made by the
judge or arbitrator in prior awards and decisions outside the context of a case decision or award (such as informal remarks or in
academic writing), which give the impression that the arbitrator
has developed a conflict; 158 repeat appointments in related cases or
cases addressing similar issues; involvement in previous related
(domestic or international) proceedings; or prior knowledge of
the case from other professional experience (diplomatic or policyrelated) .159 The challenge of one arbitrator may produce a chain
effect, causing other members of the tribunal to be challenged by
the opposing or same party. For example, at the PCA, more than
one member was challenged in seven of the twenty-four challenges
filed in investor-state arbitrations, and in four of those cases, challenges were lodged by one side against the arbitrator appointed by
the other side within one month of each other. 1 60
III.

STRENGTHENING CHALLENGE AND REcusAL RuLES TO

STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS

Part I of this Article analyzed the existing challenge procedures
in some of the most relevant international courts and tribunals and
showed that international judicial actors use many different mechanisms to remove a judge or arbitrator who they believe has lost the
required qualities to sit as a judge, namely his or her indepenused by Argentina in Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011), http:/ /www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/ case-documents/ita0236.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/KB2K-U48P].
156. In the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, reasons alleged by Iran to challenge an arbitrator include: that the arbitrator assisted claimants with their case; that the arbitrator regularly interlered with the presentation of respondent's case; and that the arbitrator exerted
an overbearing presence such that he controlled the deliberations of the tribunal. See
Caplan, supra note 129, at 122-29.
157. At the PCA: in a set of challenges against each member of one tribunal, the
respondent party alleged that the tribunal had "persistently failed to devote the necessary
time to rule on important issues in the arbitration," such that a reasonable observer would
conclude that its conduct constituted an impermissible failure to act for the purposes of
Article 13 of the Rules. Grimmer, supra note 69, at 112. The challenging party also
invoked the law of the seat of arbitration that provided that the mandate of the tribunal
could be terminated if, after repeated reminders, the tribunal carried out its mandate in
an "unacceptably slow manner." Id.
158. Id. at 106.
159. Id. at 107-09.
160. Id. at 82-83.
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dence. Part I also highlighted some important differences and
anomalies among the applicable procedures, and demonstrated
that there is no one system, agreed upon by all, to challenge an
international adjudicator. Part II examined the results of the application of challenge procedures. It demonstrated that challenges
are seldom successful regardless of the applicable procedural
mechanisms. This conclusion is valid across the board, for all
courts and tribunals, and it is also in line with the rate of challenges accepted in domestic procedures. 1 6 1
This Part assesses and builds on these findings. Specifically, it
argues that as the impact and use of international courts and tribunals increases, the mechanisms that guarantee the statutory
requirements that judges be independent and impartial become
particularly important. Control mechanisms exercised by the parties through challenge procedures need to be responsive, because
international courts and tribunals must be seen as independent
and impartial actors in the international community for their judgments to be respected. This Part suggests two ways to correct
existing anomalies that each build on the existing challenge system: (I) increased use of external actors to decide challenges and
(2) adoption of a common standard of review based on a reasonable and informed third party.
A

International Courts and Tribunals: Independence and Control

International actors increasingly rely on decisions by international courts and tribunals for several reasons. Former ICJ Judge
Kenneth Keith suggests several factors, as follows:
161. There are very little data on tlie rate of recusals. The Judicial Disqualification
Project, a 2008 report funded by tlie American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Judicial Independence, contains tlie most comprehensive information about recusals and
disqualifications in tlie United States. The report indicates tliat only a few states maintain
data on tlie rates of challenges and recusals, and also recommends tliat states begin to
maintain tliis data in order to better illuminate tlie recusal process. See American Bar
Association (ABA), Report of the Judicial Disqualification Project (Draft) 33, (Sept. 2008), http:/
/www.americanbar.org/ con tent/ dam/ aha/ administrative/judicial_independence/jdp_
geyh_report.autlicheckdam.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/5]26-YPPY]. There are some data available on Supreme Court recusals. According to an analysis of data from 1946-2010,Justices
recuse tliemselves in 2.1 % of cases, on average. Robert]. Hume, Deciding Not to Decide: The
Politics ofRecusals on the U.S. Supreme Court, 48 L. & Soc. REv. 621, 625 (2014). Justice Fortas
had tlie highest rate of recusals, at 6.2%, and Justice Ginsberg had tlie lowest rate, at
0.06%. Id. at 626. Most judges recuse tliemselves sua sponte, recusal motions are rarely
filed, probably because litigants are reluctant to accuse tlie Justices of being biased. Id. at
627.
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1. [T]he changing international context which increasingly
includes extensive international regulation the application of
which gives rise to more and more disputes;
2. [T]he related recognition by [s]tates that third party settlement may have a necessary place in more and more of those
areas of international relations;
3. [T]he increasing recognition, at least as Qudge Keith] see[s]
it, that the courts and tribunals are composed of well qualified,
independent, conscientious judges following fair proceedings
and deciding according to law. 162

That judges are seen as independent is, then, one of the key reasons that parties choose international judicial mechanisms. 163
Once judges are selected, their independence is guaranteed by
challenge procedures and controlled by the parties' ability to make
challenges. 164
1.

Challenge Mechanisms Guarantee the Independence of
Judges and Arbitrators

When states choose to go to international adjudication, "they
choose to forego some amount of their sovereignty in favor of
other values." 165 These values include peaceful dispute resolution
over use of force, universal human rights, addressing the concerns
of international investment in the resolution of economic disputes,
and the collective punishment of those who are accused of committing atrocities against humanity. 166 Similarly, private parties' preference for international adjudication over domestic proceedings
highlights the values of neutrality and comity. 167 To ensure these
choices remain valuable and justified, international proceedings
offer certain guarantees of independence to users. 168
Independence is an essential tenet of fair and unbiased proceedings. Judicial independence is "recognized to be a significant factor in maintaining the credibility and legitimacy of international
162. Keith, supra note 1, at 266.
163. See generally Karen J. Alter, De/,egating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. OtherBinding De/,egation, 71 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 37, 56-64 (2008) (demonstrating a proliferation in the number of international courts and its usage); Yuval Shany, No Longer a Weak
Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New International Judiciary, 20 EuR. J.
INT'L L. 73 (2009) (addressing the rise in the number of international courts and parties'
increased invocation).
164. See infra Sections 111.A.2-3.
165. Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REv. 107, 159 (2009).
166. Id. at 160.
167. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CoNFLICT REsoL. 395, 404 (2009).
168. See Grossman, supra note 165, at 133.
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courts and tribunals." 169 Indeed, as highlighted above, 170 the statutes of every international court and tribunal require judges and
arbitrators to be independent and impartial. 171 The IC1Y
addressed this point and confirmed the importance of the independence and impartiality of arbitrators and judges as a main
requirement of a fair trial. 112 In the seminal case of Prosecutor v.
Anto Furundiija, the Appeals Chamber of the IC1Y affirmed that
"the fundamental human right of an accused to be tried before an
independent and impartial tribunal is generally recognised as
being an integral component of the requirement that an accused
should have a fair trial. "173
In addition to being an essential element of a fair trial, independence of the judiciary also enhances the legitimacy of international
courts and tribunals, understood as "the perception that an international adjudicative body possess justified authority, and that this
perception may vary over time and across different international
actors who may influence state preferences." 174 Because international courts and tribunals decide an increasing number of disputes involving sovereign states that have important economic,
political, and social implications, rules of procedure and control
mechanisms related to ensuring the independence and impartiality of judges and arbitrators are key components of legitimacy. 175
Former International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
President, Rudiger Wolfrum, asserted that an authority is considered "legitimate because it exercises its powers through procedures
seen as adequate or fair." 176 In particular, rules concerning the
"composition or establishment of an institution and rules concern169. Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 9, at 271.
170. See supra Part I.
171. See Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 9, at 275 ("The statutes and rules of the various
tribunals address the issue[s], at least in general terms, by setting out the criteria for qualification as a judge and the requirements of independence and impartiality .... Although
the formulations and practices vary, the rules demonstrate a general commitment to independence and impartiality.").
172. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17 /l-A99, Judgment, ii 177 (Int'!
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000).
173. Id.
174. Grossman, supra note 165, at 160 (also noting that a court would be perceived as
legitimate if it is "fair and unbiased" and "transparent and infused with democratic
norms").
175. See Oellers-Frahm, supra note 12, ii 33; see also RuTH MACKENZIE ET AL., SELECTING
INTERNATIONAL JUDGES: PRINCIPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS (2010) (describing the global
importance and mechanics of the judicial appointment process in the International Court
of Justice and the International Criminal Court).
176. Wolfrum, supra note 10, ii 7 (exploring the concept of legitimacy in international
law).
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ing its decision-making process may become relevant in this context."177 The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
confirmed "[a]n international human rights tribunal which lacks
independence cannot be legitimate. An international tribunal
without legitimacy cannot be effective." 178 It is important that, by
being independent, international courts and tribunals are considered and perceived as holding legitimate authority by all
constituencies.
Moreover, an independent judiciary ensures that others trust
and legitimize judicial actors, which in turn ensures institutional
support and guarantees that the institution's awards and judgments are respected and implemented. 179 International courts and
tribunals rely on their legitimacy to safeguard enforcement of their
decisions. 180 Indeed, there is no enforcement authority despite the
legal mandate to ensure enforcement of their decisions. 181
The requirement of independence is exemplified in the process
of selection and removal of judges and arbitrators. As in domestic
systems, in the international context 'judicial independence has
numerous dimensions" including procedures for nomination and
selection. 182 The most important criteria to assess the independence of international judges are independent selection and tenure.183 Challenge procedures relate to these criteria because they
address concerns that parties may have after the judges' initial
selection and during their tenure in office. The ECHR addressed
the issue and, in Langborger v. Sweden, confirmed that "to establish
whether a body can be considered 'independent,' regard must be
had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and
their term of office, to the existence of guarantees against outside
pressures and to the question whether the body presents an
177. Id.
178. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Donal K Coffey, Legitimacy and Independence of International Tribuna/,s: An Analysis of the Eurcpean Court of Human Rights, 37 HAsTINGS INT'L &
CoMP. L. REv. 271, 272 (2014).
179. On the debate between independence and effectiveness of international courts,
see Posner & Yoo, supra note 11, at 7 (arguing that no such correlation exists); Helfer &
Slaughter, supra note 11, 904-05 (responding to Posner and Yoo and arguing that the most
effective courts are the most independent ones); Shany, supra note 11, 253-54 (suggesting
a new, goal-oriented, approach to assess international judicial effectiveness).
180. See supra Section III.A.I.
181. See supra Section I.A.
182. Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 9, at 276.
183. Keohane et al., supra note 148, at 460 ("[T]he extent to which members of an
international tribunal are independent reflects the extent to which they can free themselves from at least three categories of institutional constraints .... The most important
criterion is independent selection and tenure.").
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appearance of independence." 184 Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Zejnil
Delalic, the ICTY made this point clearly and explicitly, asserting
that,
[i]n determining whether a body can be considered to be independent-notably of the executive and the parties in the casethe Court has had regard to the manner of appointment of its
members and the duration of their term of office, the existence
of guarantees against outside pressures and the question
whether the body presents an appearance of independence. 185
The Sections below explain how challenge procedures guarantee
the independence of judges and arbitrators by providing the parties with an opportunity to correct any potential lack of independence or appearance of lack of independence.
2.

Challenge Mechanisms Allow Parties to Control the
Independence of Judges and Arbitrators

Decisions of international courts and tribunals are processes that
are essentially voluntary and consensual. 186 Parties participating in
these processes maintain an expectation of certain specific forms
of control, 187 where "[c]ontrol is concerned with maintenance of
the minimum conditions necessary for the continuation of the process of decision itself." 188 Challenges are thus important mechanisms by which parties, both states and individuals, exercise control
over the independence of international judges and arbitrators
once they have been appointed. 189 That parties have this control
allows for the continuation of the process of decision-making by
guaranteeing the independence of judges and arbitrators.
Challenges as a control mechanism are also important because
they ensure that parties remain engaged and satisfied with the proceedings. Indeed, when mechanisms of control break down, actors
may choose other mechanisms to resolve disputes. 190 Retaining
challenges as a control mechanism is also particularly important in
184. Langborger v. Sweden, 155 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1989).
185. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision of the Bureau on Motion on
Judicial Independence (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 4, 1998) (quoting
Campbell & Fell v. United Kingdom, 80 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 39-40 (1984)), http://
www.icty.org/x/ cases/mucic/tdec/ en/80904MSX5309.htm [https:/ /perma.cc/86BR3MBX].
186. W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration,
1989 DuKE LJ. 740, 743 (1989).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 748.
189. Another important control mechanism is the selection process itself. For the
author's work on selection, see generally Giorgetti, supra note 8.
190. See Reisman, supra note 186, at 743.
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an international judicial setting, which lacks a systematic and hierarchical organization and is based on voluntary commitments. 191
In this day and age, the exercise of that control is also important
because, as a consequence of the increased recourse to international courts and tribunals, there are also more challenge requests
filed by the parties. 192 Indeed, the topic of challenges "needs more
attention with the increasing number of international judges,
which will probably lead to an increase in critical situations." 193

3.

Independence and Control in Current Challenge Procedures
Similar to existing debates on the domestic level, 194 avoiding
"the appearance of bias by judges in international courts and tribunals" has become an important concern in the international context.195 There is no single mechanism to challenge international
judges and arbitrators. 196 Some of the mechanisms that presently
exist to ensure the possibility of challenging judges and arbitrators-and thus that have a control function in guaranteeing independence-may not be seen as providing a sufficient guarantee of
independence.
191. See generally Lorns HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAw AND FOREIGN Poucv 23-24
(2d ed. 1979) (discussing the limitations of international law, specifically that the law of
nations is based upon states' voluntary obligations to one another and lacks an "effective
judiciary to clarify and develop the law, to resolve disputes impartially, and to impel
nations to observe the law.").
192. VoLTERRA-FIETTA, supra note 124 ("In recent years, there has been a proliferation
of challenges to arbitrators in international investment treaty arbitrations. . . . This
proliferation may be attributed to various factors, including: (i) conflicts arising from the
fact that a rapidly expanding caseload has jeopardi[z)ed the perceived independence of
individuals who have acted as counsel or sat as arbitrator in numerous proceedings; (ii) the
perception that parties are, in any case, increasingly interested in the impartiality of their
tribunal; and (iii) the desire by some parties to d"isrupt and delay proceedings to the maximum possible extent.").
193. Oellers-Frahm, supra note 12, , 20.
194. There is abundant literature that studies this issue domestically, but the issue is
newer for international courts and tribunals, which, as dispute resolution fora, have only
more recently acquired "teeth." See, e.g., Leslie W. Abramson, Speci.fjing Grounds for judicial
Disqualification in Federal Courts, 72 NEB. L. REv. 1046 (1993) (addressing whether domestic
courts avoid the appearance of bias by allowing a judge to be disqualified sua sponte or by
motion of one of the parties for a proscribed conflict of interest under 28 U .S.C. § 455 (b));
Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who judges the judges?, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 543
(1994) (discussing whether and how a judge must, may, or cannot refer a motion to disqualify another judge); Debra Lyn Bassett, judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate
Courts, 87 IowA L. REv. 1213 (2002) (discussing the need for significant revisions to
existing disqualification procedures for federal appellate judges); Debra Lyn Bassett,
Recusal and the Supreme Court, 55 HASTINGS LJ. 657 (2005) (discussing the constitutional
and enforcement issues of recusal in the United States Supreme Court).
195. Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 9, at 272.
196. See supra Section I.A.
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Further, it 1s extremely difficult to remove an arbitrator or a
judge under the present rules. 197 Most courts and tribunals,
including such important institutions as the ICJ and the ICC, have
not seen any case of successful challenge proceedings. 198 This is
not problematic per se. In domestic proceedings the rate of
accepted challenges is also very low. 199 In the United States, for
example, available data are limited to self-recusal by members of
the Supreme Court, and show that from 1946-2010, Justices
recused themselves in 2.1 % of cases. 200 Domestic statistics may not
necessarily be a good baseline for comparison, however, as the
international adjudicatory system is substantially different from the
domestic one. 201 Still, there appears to be much more interest in
international judicial challenges, while domestic challenges remain
a relatively uncontested issue. 202
Moreover, a problem arises if the low rate of successful challenges is seen as the result of unfair procedures. 203 As the use of
international courts increase and more parties select international
proceedings, avoiding any appearance of bias becomes increasingly
important to ensure the existence of the system. Challenge and
recusal procedures must be seen as fair and legitimate.
First, it is important that decisions regarding challenges are
made by an authority that is considered independent and legitimate. As Mackenzie and Sands note:
In many cases these general formulations are supplemented by
more detailed rules guiding, for example, when judges ought to
recuse themselves. In some cases, international courts have
extremely strict rules prohibiting all forms of outside activity as a
means of ensuring independence. In other cases, the guidelines
are more flexible. Although the formulations and practices
197. See supra Section II.A.
198. See id.
199. See generally ABA, supra note 161 (indicating that only a few states maintain data on
the rates of challenges and recusals).
200. See Hume, supra note 161, at 625.
201. The author is grateful to Catherine Rogers for this comment. In contrast to an
international tribunal, for example, the United States' federal judiciary is based on permanent judges, cases are often assigned after pre-screening, and bases for recusals are
different.
202. The author wishes to thank Susan Franck for this insight. On international challenges, a recent six-part story investigates investor-state dispute settlement that appeared
on Buzzfeed. Chris Hamby, Secrets of a Global Super Court, BuzzFEEn, https:/ /
www.buzzfeed.com/globalsupercourt [https://perma.cc/VC9A-4Y5J] (last visited Oct. 21,
2016).
203. See id.
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vary, the rules demonstrate a general commitment to independence and impartiality.20 4

Second, when deciding on challenge and recusal requests, the
same standard of independence and appearance of independence
should be upheld. Certainly, in the context of international courts
and tribunals "the guiding principle seems to be that 'the appearance of fairness is as important as fairness itself[,]'" because the
appearance of fairness promotes the confidence of the public in
the legitimacy of international courts and tribunals. 205 Thus,
"[l] egitimizing international adjudicators increases trust in the rule
of law, persuading governments and private disputants to rely upon
international courts and tribunals." 206 Tribunals themselves have
recognized this principle. As the ICTY asserted in Furundiija, a tribunal is required "not only [to be] genuinely impartial, but also
[to] appear[] to be impartial."201
Third, the appearance-of-independence requirement must also
be preserved when assessing challenge requests. At present, certain rules-notably ICSID's-require a "manifest" or objective standard while other rules-for example, the ICJ's-do not explicitly
require any standard of review. 208 Moreover, the present system
allows, in certain cases (and notably at ICSID), fellow arbitrators to
decide on challenges. 209 This does not fulfill the appearance-ofindependence requirement, and thus undermines the normative
and sociological legitimacy of courts and tribunals.
B.

tvho Decides the Challenge?

Currently, decisions are made either by the remaining members
of the court or by an external or semi-external body. 210 However,
204. Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 9, at 275.
205. Joseph R. Brubaker, The Judge Who Knew Too Much: Issue Conflicts in International
Adjudication, BERKELEY]. INT'L L. lll, 113 (2008).
206. Id.
207. Prosecutor v. Furund_ija, Case No. IT-95-17 /l-A99, Judgment, 'll 182.
208. See supra Section l.B. l.
209. See supra Section l.B.3.
210. See supra Section J.B. This challenge system, where the remaining judges decide
by majority issues of recusals, mirrors the system used in domestic courts. Still, international and domestic systems are very different, such that what works in domestic systems
does not necessarily translate to the international system. Indeed, there may be a higher
requirement for independence in international courts, which lack a police force to enforce
their decisions and rely on voluntary agreements. Moreover, and more cogently, the
domestic system itself is not immune from criticism. See generally, Pamela S. Karlan, Electing
judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton, 123 HARV. L. REv. 80 passim (2009)
(discussing the challenges of an election system where individuals with matters before the
Court are able to contribute to judicial campaigns); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations
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having an external actor decide on the delicate matter of removal
of a judge or an arbitrator is preferable to a decision by the remainder of members of the court, because this ensures that an independent entity, not vested in the specific case, decides this
fundamental matter.
Under some procedural rules, decisions on challenges are taken
by an external body. Under UNCITRAL Rules, for example, the
appointing authority decides on challenges. 211 Under other rules,
the decision is taken by a body that is external to the case, but still
within the judicial organ. 21 2 At the IC1Y, the IC1Y president may
appoint a panel of three judges from other chambers to report to
him or her their decision on the challenge application. 213 At the
ICTR, it is the Bureau, composed of the president, the vice-president, and the presiding judge of the Trial Chambers, that decides
on the request.214
Requiring an international court or tribunal to hand challenge
decisions to an external or semi-external actor could pose drawbacks, however. For example, a decision taken by an external actor
may take longer than a decision taken in-house. Indeed, the deciding authority may be required to review voluminous case materials
with which he or she is not familiar, but which would be utterly
familiar to judges and arbitrators participating in the case. 215
Practice, however, shows that this is not necessarily the case. For
example, an external party may be able to reach a decision in a
matter of months. In a case relating to the challenge of two ICSID
arbitrators brought by respondent Argentina, it was decided that
the secretary general of the PCA would recommend a course of
action, as required by prior agreement of the parties. 216 The secretary general of the PCA had not been part of the litigation prior to
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE LJ. 2599 passim (1997) (providing background on the
complex and multi-dimensional reasoning behind a nation's choice to follow international
law); Arny Brittain & Sari Horwitz, justice Scalia Spent His Last Hours with Members of This
Secretive Society of Elite Hunters, WASH. PosT (Feb. 24, 2016), https:/ I
www.washingtonpost.com/world/ national-security /justice-scalia-spen t-his-last-hours-withmembers-of-this-secretive-society-of-eli te-hun ters/2016 I 02/ 24/ 1d77af38-db20-l l e5-89 la4ed04f42l3e8_story .html [https:/ /perma.cc/WE7U-AGPQ] (describing the secret friendships judges can have, which calls into question the legitimacy of the body).
211. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 59, art. 13(4).
212. See supra Section LB.
213. See supra Section l.B.4.
214. See id.
215. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
216. See Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07 /5, Recommendation
Pursuant to the Request by ICSID Dated November 18, 2011 on the Respondent's Proposal
for the Disqualification of Professor Pierre Tercier and Professor Albert Jan Van Den Berg
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the request, and to make an informed decision he asked to review
the entire file. 217 This required all the documents to be sent to
The Hague. 218 The underlying ICSID proceedings were suspended, and the decision was issued on December 19, 2011,
approximately three months after Argentina filed its request and
only one month after the request was sent to the PCA.2 19 Thus,
though the proceedings were delayed, the delay was minimal and
in line with the length of challenge proceedings decided by an
internal actor. 2 2° This example demonstrates that an external
actor can efficiently take decisions on urgent and delicate matters
related to challenges.
An additional concern about appointing an external or semiexternal actor is that he or she may not be bound by the same
confidentiality requirements as the adjudicators. 221 This is a valid
concern, but one that can easily be overcome by imposing on the
deciding authority confidentiality obligations.
Another important issue to consider is that an external actor
may not be as familiar with the applicable rules of procedure; however, it is important that someone familiar with the rules is chosen
to take challenge decisions. In international arbitration under
UNCITRAL Rules, for example, it is the appointing authority that
decides on challenges. 222 Because the appointing authority was
involved in the initial selection of the challenged arbitrator, he or
she will be familiar with the rules applicable to the proceedings. 223
When procedural rules call for an external or semi-external
actor to decide challenges, several methods can be used to estabDated September 15, 2011, 1[ 24 (Dec. 19, 2011), http:/ /www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/ case-documents/ita0240. pelf [https:/ /perma.cc/FJ5X-DXMU].
217. See id. 'll 27.
218. See id. 'll'll 33, 42.
219. See id. 'll'll 15-43 (procedural history).
220. For example, in a subsequent challenge in the same case decided by the secretary
general of ICSID, Argentina filed its request on December 19, 2013 and January 13, 2014,
and the decision was issued on February 4, 2014. Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07 /5, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify a Majority of the Tribunal, 'll'll
45-46, 83 (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw3057.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/57C9-TZE3].
221. On the issue of confidentiality, see Neale H. Bergman, Transparency of the Proceedings and Third Party Participation, in LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: A
PRACTITIONER'S GumE 375 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2014) (discussing the shift towards more
transparent arbitration procedures, while maintaining protection for confidential matters); Loretta Malintoppi, Methods of Dispute Resolution in Inter-State Litigation: When States Go
to Arbitration Rather Than Adjudication, 5 L. & PRAc. INT'L CT. & TRIBUNALS 133, 140 (2006).
222. See supra Section l.B.2.
223. See id.
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lish that external body. In arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules,
the external actor is the appointing authority. 224 Other international courts use a semi-external actor to decide on challenges.
The ICTR and IC1Y, for example, constitute a special ad hoc body
composed of judges not involved in the specific proceedings at
issue.22 5 Thus, at the IC1Y, if a challenge arises, the chamber's presiding judge confers first with the judge in question, and then, if
necessary, the IC1Y president appoints a panel of three judges
from other chambers to report their decision on the merits of the
challenge to the president. 226 Similarly, at the !CTR, the chamber's presiding judge would first confer with the judge in question
and then, if necessary, the Bureau (composed of the ICTR president, the vice-president, and the presiding judge of the Trial
Chambers) would determine the merits of the challenge. 227 This
structure is possible because both the !CTR and the IC1Y are
divided into Trial Chambers and Appeals Chambers, while other
courts decide en bane. 22s
Using a body external to the arbitrators or creating a separate
body-within the court-of judges who take no part in the specific
case maintains the independence of judges and ensures that there
is no appearance of bias. 229 Moreover, it strengthens the legitimacy of the forum and thus the effectiveness of its decisions. 230
Though an external or semi-external entity can be constructed
in different ways per procedural rules, not all courts and tribunals
rely on this mechanism to decide challenges. Generally, perma224. See id.
225. See supra Section I.B.4.
226. See id.
227. ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 93, rs. 15, 23.
228. Organisational Chart: Organisation of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugosla..
via, ICTY, http:/ /www.icty.org/ en/ about/tribunal/ organisational-chart [https:/ I
perma.cc/8NAH-MRUH] (last visited Oct. 21, 2016); U.N. Mechanism for the Int'! Crim.
Tribunals, Chambers, ICTR, http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal/chambers [https://
perma.cc/PQU2-HDRJJ (last visited Oct. 21, 2016).
229. For a review of the meaning of impartiality, and interesting empirical assessment
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), see Erik Voten, The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the Euro-pean Court of Human Rights, 102 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 417,
417 (2008) (additionally stating, "Despite the consensus that impartiality is the cornerstone
of effective international adjudication, there is no agreement on whether or under what
circumstances international judges can indeed be relied upon to impartially resolve disputes. Some scholars argue that governments exert a great deal of influence over the
choices of even formally independent international judges. Others, however, counter that
the ability of governments to monitor and sanction judges is generally weak and ineffective
at swaying judges.") (internal citations omitted).
230. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 11, 904-05 (responding to Posner and Yoo and
arguing that the most effective courts are the most independent ones).
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nent courts do not use an external or semi-external actor to take
decisions on challenges. In permanent courts, like the ICJ and the
ICC, decisions are typically taken by a majority of the judges, without the participation of the challengedjudge. 231 For example, the
ICC is-similarly to the ICTY and !CTR-composed of Trial and
Appeals Chambers, yet the majority of the full court decides challenges. 23 2 The views of the challenged judge are normally heard
and taken into consideration, but the challenged judge can neither
participate in the deliberation of the court on the matter, nor take
part in the voting.233
Some may link the differences in procedures amongst international courts and tribunals with the discrepancy in tenure amongst
the different international adjudicators as a possible explanation
for diverse challenge procedures. Security of tenure and mode of
election may be important in assessing judicial behavior during
challenge proceedings. At the ICJ, for example,judges serve nineyear terms and they can be re-elected.2 34 At the ICC, judges also
serve for nine years, but can only serve for one term. 235 In contrast, judges at the ICTY and ICTR are elected for four-year terms
but may be re-elected multiple times. 236 Arbitrators, on the other
hand, typically sit for much shorter periods 237 : they are appointed
for a specific case and when the case terminates, their mandate
ends as well, though they are very often repeat players. 238 Thus,
one could argue that a longer term (as at the ICJ) or a unique term
(as at the ICC) may guarantee a more independent judiciary and
thus could justify members of the court themselves taking challenge decisions directly.
231. See supra Sections I.B.l, I.B.5.
232. See supra Section I.B.5.
233. See id.
234. ICJ Statute, supra note 36, art. 13.
235. ICC Statute, supra note 107, art. 36(9) (a) ("OJudges shall hold office for a term of
nine years and subject to [two minimal and enumerated exceptions] shall not be eligible
for re-election.").
236. Election Process, IC1Y, http:/ /www.icty.org/en/about/chambers/election-process
[https:/ /perma.cc/38Y3-2WN3] ("Permanent judges serve for a term of four years after
which they are eligible for re-election.") (last visited Oct. 13, 2016); ICTR, supra note 228
(regarding ICTR election procedures, "All of the judges were elected by the United
Nations General Assembly from a list submitted by the Security Council. The Judges were
elected for a term of [four] years and were eligible for re-election.").
237. See generally Chiara Giorgetti, The Arbritrial Tribunal: Selection and Replacement of
Arbitrators, in LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE,
145, 145 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2014) (describing the process in international investment
arbitrations of party and third-party appointment of the arbitration panel members).
238. See Giorgetti, supra note 8, at 454.
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However, critics also point out that judges may be cognizant of
length and security of tenure when making decisions, such that
they may be more cautious or inclined to find for a state or an
appointing actor when the judges are subject to re-election. 239
Others view judges' re-election as a safety mechanism to ensure a
less idiosyncratic judiciary and are more inclined to view changes
in the bench positively. 240 Thus, based on the possibility of re-election, one might argue that judges at the ICJ, IC1Y, or ICTR would
be more inclined to find for the state or an appointer than a judge
at the ICC. The length of tenure may also play a role, as a judge or
an arbitrator whose re-election or re-appointment is on the line
may be more attentive to the appointing authority.
Yet, the difference in tenure itself may not be as staggering as
initially perceived. For example, once their term in one court is
terminated and cannot be renewed, several judges seek election in
other international courts and tribunals. 241 It is also the case that
judges and arbitrators increasingly sit on several cases at one time,
which may intensify possible conflicts and the appearance of
bias. 242
Thus, though the system of self-recusals and full court decisions
have worked in the past, the current situation of increased use of
international judicial bodies-and the ensuing increase in the
number of judicial actors-may require a rethinking of what constitute the best challenge procedures. 243
Another argument to justify the different challenge procedures
in the various international courts and tribunals is the fact that per239. See generally Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 9, at 278-79 (stating that elections to
the ICJ are "highly politicized" and "[w]ithout the support of any influential states, the
electoral prospects for any candidate would be slim. . . . Elections involving judges standing for re[-]election can focus on cases decided by the judge. This practice raises many
eyebrows.").
240. Id.
241. For example, ICJ Judge Julia Sebutinde, who before joining the ICJ was a judge at
the Special Court of Sierra Leone. See Current Members. judge Julia Sebutinde, INT'L CT. JusT.,
http:/ /www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pl=l&p2=2&p3=l&judge=l94 [https:/ I
perma.cc/YH26-RPH3] (last visited Oct. 13, 2016). Another example is Judge Elizabeth
Odio Benito, who was a judge at the IC1Y from 1993 to 1998 and was elected to the ICC in
2003. See judge Elizabeth Odio Benito, U.N. AumoVISUAL LIBR. INT'L L., http:/ /legal.un.org/
avl/pdf/ls/Odio-Benito_bio.pdf [https://perma.cc/664N-NS3S]
(last visited Oct. 13,
2016). Similarly, Judge Bruno Simma was nominated to judge at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal after serving at the ICJ. See John Masson, MLaw Prof Appointed to Iran-United States
Claims Tribuna~ M1cH. L. NEWSROOM (Nov. 6, 2012), https://www.law.umich.edu/newsandinfo/features/Pages/simma_appointment.aspx [https:/ /perma.cc/E8YE-9YJQ].
242. For a thorough analysis of the relationships between arbitrators and their cases,
see Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EuRo.]. INT'L L. 387 (2014).
243. See Giorgetti, supra note 42, at 4, 15-18.
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manent courts are typically constituted by a substantial number of
judges.2 44 The ICJ has fifteen judges, and the ICC eighteen. 245
The approach of letting the remaining members of a permanent
court decide on the removal of one of its members may initially
seem reasonable because the number of judges in the respective
courts dilutes the relevance of the vote of any particular judge.
Though this argument may ease concern for an appearance of
bias, it is not ideal for members of the same court to decide on
whether a fellow judge should sit on a certain case. 246 Even if the
membership of the court is large, it can still create conflicts, resentment, and uneasiness. 247 Moreover, the esprit de groupe may make
members of the same group (in this case the court) reluctant to
decide against another member, as they may do in an otherwise
similar situation. 24s
244. See supra Sections I.B.l, l.B.5.
245. ICJ Statute, supra note 36, art. 3 and ICC Statute, supra note 107, art. 36,
respectively.
246. Witness, for example, the current debate on the replacement of Justice Scalia of
the U.S. Supreme Court. The issue of recusal was engendered by the fact that the Justice
was found in a resort and it was unclear who had paid for the stay or the charter plane
there. The question of recusal of Justices was also discussed in a 2011 report by Chief
Justice Roberts, who noted that while lower domestic courts can substitute for one another,
there is only one U.S. Supreme Court, and "if a Justice withdraws from a case, the Court
must sit without its full membership." Sup. Ct. of the U.S., 2011 Year-End Report on the
Federal Judiciary 9 (2011). As the Washington Post reported:
Roberts issued his report at the end of a year in which more than 100 law professors nationwide asked Congress to give the Supreme Court an ethical code of
conduct after it emerged that Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas had attended
private political meetings sponsored by billionaire conservative donors David and
Charles Koch. That same year, Kagan was called on to recuse herself from hearing challenges to health-care reform, and a watchdog group said Thomas had
failed to report his wife's income from a conservative think tank before he
amended his financial forms. [Roberts added that] it would not be wise for
OJustices to review the recusal decisions made by the their peers. He said that "it
would create an undesirable situation" enabling OJustices to play a role in determining which others get to weigh in on cases. He said, "I have complete confidence in the capability of my colleagues to determine when recusal is warranted,"
[and that] " [ t] hey are jurists of exceptional integrity and experience whose character and fitness have been examined through a rigorous appointment and confirmation process."
Mark Berman &Jerry Markon, Why justice Scalia was Staying for Free at a Texas Resort, WASH.
PosT (Feb. 17, 2016), https:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/02/
17/justice-scalias-death-and-questions-about-who-pays-for-supreme-courtjustices-to-visitremote-resorts/?hpidHP_rhp-top-table-main_scalia-resort-925am %3Ahomepage% 2Fstory
[https:/ / perma.cc/J8XE-RV3JJ.
247. See generalry Todd Tucker, Inside the Black Box: Collegial Patterns on Investment Tribunals, 7 J. INT'L. D1sP. SETTLEMENT 183 (2016) (examining the collegial dynamics of within
investment tribunals).
248. See generally ROBERT KOLB, THE ELGAR COMPANION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE 81 (2014) (discussing the esprit de corps versus the concept of autonomy among
the justices of the ICJ); Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment
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Still, it may be justifiable to ask all the members of the court to
decide a challenge because judges in permanent courts are elected
through an intricate process that involves national nomination
committees, states, and several organs of the United Nations. 249
This presumably insulates the judges from fear of retaliation or
uneasiness in their position.250
However, though it is true that judges in permanent international courts are not nominated directly by the parties-as is the
case in arbitration-but indirectly by governments, this does little
to undermine the argument that to avoid the appearance of bias,
decisions on challenges should be taken by an external actor. 251
Indeed, in this day and age, much more is expected of members of
the international judiciary. To reinforce their independence and
appearance of independence, 25 2 decisions on challenges would be
stronger if taken by an independent and super partes body.
Permanent tribunals have several options to establish independent bodies responsible for deciding challenges. For example,
retired judges and former ICJ presidents could be asked to assume
the role of advisers in such matters. The use of an external decision-maker may also be envisaged. For example, the Rules of Procedure of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commissions (which
adopted modified UNCITRAL Rules) specified that if a commissioner were to be challenged, the U.N. Secretary General would be
tasked with naming an "Appointing Authority" to resolve the challenge.253 Alternatively, but less preferably, in the case of the ICJ,
the process could be strengthened internally: where the court generally decides en bane, a standing committee on disciplinary matters or judicial ethics could be created, composed of the president,
the vice-president, and certain nominated members of the court,
to give advice to the entire court on the challenge application.
Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1, 75 (2007) (empirically assessing the claim that arbitrators are "Pale, Male and Stale" or "Mafia").
249. For more on the election ofjudges at the ICJ and ICC, see MACKENZIE ET AL., supra
note 175, at 102.
250. See ICJ Statute, supra note 36, art. 2; ICC Statute, supra note 107, art. 36; KoLB,
supra note 44, at 138; Giorgetti, supra note 42, at 3-5.
251. See MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 175, at 26 (discussing general selection criteria
for judges); Giorgetti, supra note 237, at 146.
252. See Giorgetti, supra note 8, at 453.
253. Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Comm'n, Rules of Procedure, art. 6(6) (2001) ("If the
other party does not agree to the challenge and the challenged arbitrator does not with-.
draw, the decision on the challenge will be made by an Appointing Authority designated
by the Secretary General of the United Nations. Pending the Appointing Authority's decision, the challenged arbitrator shall continue to serve as an arbitrator of the Commission,
and the Commission shall continue to perform its duties under the Agreement.").
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The ICC, on the other hand, could adopt mechanisms similar to
either the IC1Y or the ICTR.254
The situation is more urgent at ICSID. As provided by the applicable rules, decisions on challenges to the majority of the tribunal,
sole arbitrators, or when the remaining arbitrators do not agree
are taken by the chairman of the Administrative Council (and president of the World Bank) .255 This procedure allows for an independent and generally expeditious review, detached from the
proceedings. 256 These decisions are taken expeditiously and by
someone familiar with the rules and with easy access to the case. 257
However, when only one arbitrator is challenged on a three-arbitrator panel, ICSID's procedures are wanting. 258 In these situations,
under the ICSID Convention, the remaining two members of the
tribunal decide on the challenge. 259
This procedure raises many concerns. First, it puts the two
remaining arbitrators in an untenable (and unenviable) position
of having to decide on the disqualification of someone with whom
they unavoidably have a working relation. Given the small pool of
arbitrators, the challenged arbitrator would also be someone
whom the remaining members may soon encounter again as either
counsel, fellow arbitrator, or someone in front of whom they may
appear as counsel.2 60 Moreover, the complexity of deciding the
removal of a fellow arbitrator is corroborated by the available data.
Indeed, of the eighty-four challenge requests filed at ICSID, in only
one case have the two remaining arbitrators decided to uphold the
request and disqualify the challenged arbitrator.2 61
254. See supra Sections l.B.4, l.B.5.
255. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 77, r. 9.
256. See supra Section l.B.3.
257. Id.
258. VoLTERRA-FIETTA, supra note 124. The article further notes the following:
The second perceived flaw relates to the procedural method by which decisions
on disqualification are made. In this regard, it has been argued that there is a
certain illogic to placing these decisions in the hands of a challenged individual's
co-arbitrators. There are several potential reasons for concern. Those co-arbitrators may have been working with that individual for some time and be reluctant
to acknowledge any bias. Further, they may have extensive personal relationships
with the individual which might influence their decision. Finally, there may be an
underlying reluctance (however unconscious) to "cut the branch of the tree on
which they were sitting"-namely, a hesitancy for arbitrators to allow challenges
to succeed when that might consequently increase the chances of a successful
challenge being made against them.

Id.
259. See id.; see also ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 77, r. 9.
260. On the issue of the small pool of arbitrators, see Puig, supra note 242, at 388.
261. Caratube Int'l Oil Co. LLP & Hourani v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No.
ARB/13/13, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Mr. Bruno Boesch, ii 111
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Instead, it would be more desirable if the two remaining, unchallenged arbitrators declined to decide, and as a matter of
course sent the decision to the chairman of the Administrative
Council. This course of action could be an acceptable reading of
the ICSID Convention, which provides that if the "members are
equally divided," the decision is taken by the chairman. 262 Indeed,
it is possible to envisage that arbitrators can remain divided and
thus request the chairman to decide on each case.
In sum, while a decision by the remaining members of the court
may be understandable in certain circumstances, as explained, an
external or semi-external decision-maker is the preferable choice
to resolve challenge requests. This is especially true for arbitral
tribunals, which are composed by only a small number of arbitrators. That an external decision-maker for challenges is the right
course of action and is responsive to public expectations is further
supported by the wording of the newly negotiated E.U.-Canada
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, which calls for
decisions on challenges of arbitrators to be made by the ICJ
president. 263
(Mar. 20, 2014), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3133.pdf
[https:/ /perma.cc/KB8A-G5SR].
262. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, art. 58. Article 58 of the ICSID Convention
provides as follows:
The decision on any proposal to disqualify a conciliator or arbitrator shall be
taken by the other members of the Commission or Tribunal as the case may be,
provided that where those members are equally divided, or in the case of a proposal to disqualify a sole conciliator or arbitrator, or a majority of the conciliators or
arbitrators, the Chairman shall take that decision. If it is decided that the proposal is well-founded the conciliator or arbitrator to whom the decision relates shall
be replaced in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Chapter III or Section 2 of Chapter IV.

Id.
263. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., art. 8.30.3,July 5,
2016, COM(2016) 443 final [hereinafter CETAJ, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
resource.html?uri=cellar:lfcbd7dl-4356-lle6-9c64-0laa75ed7lal.0001.02/DOC_2&for
mat=PDF [https:/ /perma.cc/PE67-9XH4] (has been formally proposed to the Council of
Europe, and now awaits a confirmation, and signatures from EU Member states). Article
8.30 of the CETA states the following:
1. The Members of the Tribunal shall be independent. They shall not be affiliated with any government. They shall not take instructions from any organisation, or government with regard to matters related to the dispute. They shall not
participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct or indirect conflict of interest. They shall comply with the International Bar Association
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration or any supplemental rules adopted pursuant to Article 8.44.2. In addition, upon appointment, they
shall refrain from acting as counsel or as party-appointed expert or witness in any
pending or new investment dispute under this or any other international
agreement.
2. If a disputing party considers that a Member of the Tribunal has a conflict of
interest, it may invite the President of the International Court ofJustice to issue a
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Applicable Standard of Review

Having determined that preference should be given to an external or semi-external body, this Section explores the standard that
international courts and tribunals should adopt and apply to the
review of challenge requests.
Across all courts and tribunals, the conditions to sit as a judge or
arbitrator include the essential requirement that the adjudicator
be impartial and independent. 264 Requirements of independence
and impartiality are found in both permanent courts like the ICJ
and the ICC, as well as in the rules of international arbitral proceedings, including UNCITRAL and ICSID.2 65 These requirements are common for courts-such as the ICC, the IC1Y, and the
ICTR~and ICSID tribunals that adjudicate inter-state claims, as
well as claims brought against or by individuals. 266 In fact, independence and impartiality are at the very core of the judicial
function. 267
A judge or arbitrator is carefully vetted during the selection process to ensure he or she possesses the qualities of independence
and impartiality that are required. 268 Then, once the selection
occurs and the judge or arbitrator is appointed, there should be a
presumption of impartiality that applies to the judicial function. 269
decision on the challenge to the appointment of such Member. Any notice of
challenge shall be sent to the President of the International Court of Justice
within [fifteen] days of the date on which the composition of the division of the
Tribunal has been communicated to the disputing party, or within [fifteen] days
of the date on which the relevant facts came to its knowledge, if they could not
have reasonably been known at the time of composition of the division. The
notice of challenge shall state the grounds for the challenge.
3. If, within [fifteen] days from the date of the notice of challenge, the challenged Member of the Tribunal has elected not to resign from the division, the
·President of the International Court of Justice may, after receiving submissions
from the disputing parties and after providing the Member of the Tribunal an
opportunity to submit any observations, issue a decision on the challenge. The
President of the International Court ofJustice shall endeavor to issue the decision
and to notify the disputing parties and the other Members of the division within
[forty-five] days of receipt of the notice of challenge. A vacancy resulting from
the disqualification or resignation of a Member of the Tribunal shall be filled
promptly.
Id. art. 8.30 (footnote omitted).
264. See supra Section I.B.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See supra Part I and Section III.A.
268. On the selection of international judges, see Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments, 9 Cm. J. INT'L L. 387, 390-98 (2009) (examining in detail the
politics of the appointment process and how it shapes the composition of the international
judiciary).
269. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17 /l-A99, Judgment,~ 196.
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In other words, challenging or trying to remove a selected arbitrator or elected judge should not be easy and should require a high
threshold of evidence, which requires a reasonable apprehension
of bias.
In Furundiija, the IC1Y made this principle very clear.2 7o Anton
Furundzija was accused of committing torture and the crime of
outrages against personal dignity, including rape, and he was on
trial at the IClY. 271 A challenge was brought against a female
judge, Judge Mumba, who had, prior to joining the court, served
on the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women. 272 The defendant in the proceedings had argued that past activities resulted in a
bias in favor of women and against crimes committed against
them. 273 In reviewing and rejecting the challenge, the Appeals
Chamber of the IC1Y observed that:
[I]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed
that the Judges of the International Tribunal "can disabuse their
minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or predispositions." It is
for the Appellant to adduce sufficient evidence to satisfy the
Appeals Chamber that Judge Mumba was not impartial in his
case. There is a high threshold to reach in order to rebut the
presumption of impartiality. 274
Similarly, the ECHR also confirmed that "the personal impartiality
of a judge must be presumed until there is proof to the contrary
"275
Hence, as a starting point, courts agree that a simple assertion by
one of the parties that they believe the judge or arbitrator is not
independent and impartial should not result in the removal of the
adjudicator. Indeed, impartiality cannot be proven by a mere
assertion of one of the parties, when the threshold of proof is high
and a presumption of impartiality accompanies the adjudicator. In
Dalalic, the IC1Y justified the high threshold required to challenge
and concluded that:
The reason for this high threshold is that, just as any real
appearance of bias [on] the part of a judge undermines confidence in the administration of justice, it would be as much of a
270. See id. 1 197.
271. See id. 1 5.
272. Id. 1 164.
273. See id. 1 206.
274. Id. 1 197.
275. Hauschildt v. Denmark, 154 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 47 (1989). The applicant
filed a petition alleging that he did not receive a fair trial by an impartial tribunal under
Article 6 of the Convention. See id. at 18. He asserted that some of the sitting judges who
had convicted him had circulated numerous pretrial decisions concerning his case. See id.
The court held that a violation of Article (6) had occurred. Id. at 23.
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potential threat to the interests of the impartial and fair administration of justice if judges were to disqualify themselves on the
basis of unfounded and unsupported allegations of apparent
bias. 276
How, then, should the impartiality of the adjudicator be assessed?
Most international fora have adopted a "reasonable" apprehension or doubt standard, as assessed by a reasonable and informed
third party. 277 It calls for the facts which are the basis of the challenge to raise justifiable doubts in a third party about the impartiality and independence of an arbitrator. 278 This is an objective
standard that allows for an acceptable review of the evidence and
that takes into consideration that challenges are serious issues that
should be proven by a reasonable third party.2 79 In the words of
the ICIY in Furundiija, "[D]isqualification is only made out by
showing that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias by reason
of prejudgment and this must be 'firmly established.' "280
There may be a risk that the same "third-party justifiable doubts"
standard would not be uniformly applied by different tribunals
with jurisdiction over different issues, 281 for example, that an ICIY
judge may be required to use a different standard than an arbitrator deciding on investment issues. That said, as demonstrated
below, practice has shown remarkable commonalities amongst
international courts and tribunals on the interpretation of standards of judicial behavior. One might nevertheless expect that certain differences would exist between different judicial bodies, as
they often continue to exist in the jurisprudence of the same courts
deciding cases based on unique facts. Finally, divergent applications of the same standard can still inform the interpretation of the
276. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 'll 707
(Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001).
277. See generally Catherine A. Rogers, The Ethics of International Arbitrators, in THE LEADING ARBITRATORS' GUIDE To INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 621 (Lawrence w. Newman &
Richard D. Hill eds., 2d ed. 2008) (providing an overview of the essential considerations
for arbitrators and parties); CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
(2014) (addressing professional obligations of primary participants in international
arbitration).
278. See DAELE, supra note 13, at ll5.
279. See Chiara Giorgetti, Towards A Revised Threshold for Arbitrators' Challenges Under
ICSID?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (July 3, 2014), http:/ /kluwerarbitrationblog.com/
2014/ 07I 03 / towards-a-revised-threshold-for-arbitrators-challenges-under-icsid [h ttps:/ I
perma.cc/6W37-BJ2X]; Giorgetti, supra note 87.
280. Prosecutor v. Furund_ija, Case No. IT-95-17 /l-A99, Judgment, 'll 197 (quoting
Mason], in ReJRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161CLR342, 352 (Aust!.)).
281. See generally Catherine A. Rogers, The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators,
12 SANTA CLARA]. INT'L L. 223 (2013) (discussing the issue of comparative statistics and
baselines when comparing different tribunals).
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standard vis-a-vis the principles of independence and impartiality,
which are inherently undetermined. 282
The Appeals Chamber of the IC1Y confirmed the existence of a
uniform approach in Furundiija where, after consulting the jurisprudence of many other international courts, it found that there
was a "general rule" that judges should not only be subjectively free
from bias, but also that nothing in the surrounding circumstances
should objectively give rise to "an appearance of bias."283 The
Appeals Chamber then observed that the appearance of bias
should be assessed by a reasonable observer and maintained that
"the reasonable person must be an informed person, with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances, including the traditions of
integrity and impartiality that form a part of the background and
apprised also of the fact that impartiality is one of the duties that
udges swear to uphold. "28 4
The ECHR also shares and applies a similar approach. In Hauschildt v. Denmark, the ECHR addressed the question of impartiality
of a judge in relation to Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, which guarantees a right to fair trial. 285 The court
asserted that, quite apart from the personal conduct of the judge,
to assess the existence of impartiality, it should determine whether
there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to a judge's
impartiality286 from the prospective of a reasonable observer. 287
The ECHR found in favor of Mr. Hauschildt and concluded that in
the circumstances of the case, the impartiality of the tribunals at
issue were "capable of appearing to be open to doubt." 288 The
ECHR argued that "even appearances may be of a certain impor-

rn

282. See generally RoGERS, supra note 277, ch. 7 (expounding on the principles of independence and impartiality).
283. Prosecutor v. Furund_ija, Case No. IT-95-17 /l-A99, Judgment, i 189.
284. Id. i 190 (quoting R.D.S. v. The Queen (1997) 3 S.C.R. 484, 486 (Can.)).
285. See Hauschildt v. Denmark, 154 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) i 1 (1989). Article 6, paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides the following:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment
shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all
or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a
democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion
of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
European Convention on Human Rights art. 6(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
286. Hauschildt v. Denmark, 154 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) i 48.
287. See id. i 43.
288. Id. i 52.
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tance [,]" because what is at stake "is the confidence which the
courts in a democratic society must inspire in the public." 289
Importantly, the same standard is also adopted in international
arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules. 290 Article 12(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules provides that an arbitrator may be challenged "if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts" as to the
"impartiality or independence" of the arbitrator.2 91 In applying
this standard, arbitral tribunals constituted under those rules clarified that "this is an objective standard in that it requires not only a
showing of doubt, but doubt that is justifiable."292 Thus, for example, in Vito Gallo v. Canada, the appointing authority decided that
from the point of view of a "reasonable and informed third party"
in the case, "there would be justifiable doubts" about the "impartiality and independence" of the challenged arbitrator if he did not
discontinue certain "advisory services" to potential intervener Mexico for the remainder of the arbitration.293
In sum, there is a general consensus amongst many international
courts and .tribunals that the appropriate standard to use is the reasonable, third-party standard. This standard is adopted by fora that
decide on a variety of issues, including individual criminal responsibility, human rights violations, and investment issues.
However, the standard is not unanimously adopted. Until
recently, ICSID tribunals, for example, were unique in adopting a
much different and narrowly read standard under Article 57 of the
ICSID Convention, which allowed for the removal of an arbitrator
only upon proof of a "manifest" lack of the qualities required to sit
as an arbitrator. 294 The standard allowed for the acceptance of a
challenge only if the challenged arbitrator manifestly lacked the
qualities required to sit as an arbitrator, and ICSID interpreted the
word "manifest" as equivalent to "obvious" or "evident." 295 The
application of the "manifest standard" had been rightly criticized
289. Id. , 48.
290. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 59, art. 12(1).
291. Id.
292. Gallo v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 55798, Decision on
the Challenge to Mr.J. Christopher Thomas, QC,, 19 (Oct. 14, 2009); Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision on the
Challenge to Arbitrator James Anaya, 2 (Nov. 28, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/ case-documents/ita0382_0.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/7YNE-QDNP].
293. Gallo v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 55798, Decision on
the Challenge to Mr. J. Christoph~r Thomas, QC , 36.
294. See ICSID Convention, supra note 72, arts. 14, 57.
295. See Baiju S. Vasani & Shaun A. Palmer, Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators at
ICSID: A New Dawn?, 30 ICSID REv. 194, 199-201 (2015).
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as excessively difficult to prove and too protective of the arbitrator. 295 Indeed, as seen above, the presumption of impartiality as
explained in Furundiija already provides sufficient protection to
the challenged arbitrator. 297
More recently, though, in Blue Bank v. Venezuela, the chairman of
the ICSID Administrative Council altered the interpretation of the
manifest standard.298 In the case, Venezuela had challenged a
claimant-appointed arbitrator, alleging that the international law
firm at which he was a partner represented a client against Venezuela in another case, albeit in a different office. 299 The chairman
applied "an objective standard based on a reasonable evaluation of
the evidence by a third party" and interpreted the word "manifest"
in the ICSID Convention "as meaning 'evident' and 'obvious' and
relating to the ease with which the alleged lack of qualities can be
perceived." 300 Hence, the chairman upheld the challenge while
staying within the boundaries set in Article 57 of the ICSID Convention. 301 Shortly thereafter, the chairman used the same standard of assessment to decide another challenge in Burlington v.
Ecuador. 302 This development is welcomed and hopefully demonstrates a change of course in challenges decided under the ICSID
Convention.
One outlier remains-the ICJ. Differently from all other courts,
neither the applicable rules nor the jurisprudence of the ICJ have
resulted in the development of a standard of review to challenges
296. See Charles B. Rosenberg, To Use a Cannon to Kill a Mosquito: Why the Increase in
Arbitrator Challenges in Investment Arbitration Does Not Warrant a Complete Overhaul of the System,
in 8 INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 19 (Ian A Laird, Borzu
Sabahi, Frederic G. Sourgens & Todd]. Weiler eds., 2015).
297. Prosecutorv. Furund_ija, Case No. IT-95-17/l-A99,Judgment, H 196-97.
298. Blue Bank Int'! & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/20, Decision on the Parties' Proposals to Disqualify a Majority of
the Tribunal, H 59-62 (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw3009.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/DT7Y-VQ43]. In the case, the respondent
had challenged the arbitrator appointed by claimant because of his partnership in the
Madrid office of Baker & McKenzie. Id. ii 23. At the time, Baker & McKenzie also represented claimant in another case against Venezuela through its offices in New York and
Caracas. Id. ii 22.
299. Id. H 22-26.
300. Id. iii! 60-61 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Suez, Sociedad General
de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Cases No. ARB/03/19, Decision
on the Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal, ii 39 (Oct.
22, 2007)).
301. Id. ii 71.
302. Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5,
Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuna, ii 68
(Dec. 13, 2013).
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there. In the only publicly available opinion on this issue, the
court rejected a request for removal of one judge without giving
any specifics of the adopted standard. 303 In the case, Legal Consequence of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Pal,estinian Territory, the U.N. General Assembly asked the court to determine the
legality of Israel's construction of a partition wall in the occupied
Palestinian territory. 304 During the proceeding, Israel requested
the president of the court to remove the Egyptian judge, Nabil
Elaraby, a former senior diplomat for Egypt. Israel raised three
issues. 305
First, it claimed that Judge Elaraby should be recused because of
his active official and public roles as an Egyptian diplomat. 30 6 The
court rejected this claim and noted that Judge Elaraby had acted as
the legal adviser to the Egyptian government, which had occurred
many years before the issue of the construction of the wall arose. 307
Second, Israel claimed that Judge Elaraby had been involved in
decisions at the General Assembly that were relevant for the
case. 308 The ICJ again dismissed the claim and concluded that the
questions submitted to the court were not discussed until after
Judge Elaraby had participated in them. 309 Third, Israel complained that in an interview prior to his election to the court, Judge
Elaraby had made statements that could suggest a prejudgment of
some of the issues in the case. 310 The court again dismissed the
claim and concluded that Judge Elaraby's comments had
"expressed no opinion on the question put in the present case." 311
Israel's request was rejected thirteen to one-as is customary,
Judge Elaraby did not participate in the vote-and the court concluded that Judge Elaraby had not previously taken part in the
case, as required for a finding of relative incompatibility by Article
17 (2) of the ICJ Statute. 312 Interestingly, Judge Buergenthal dis303. In the opinion, Israel sent a confidential letter to the ICJ president to bring to his
attention certain facts it considered possibly relevant to the participation of Judge Elaraby
in the case. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Order, 2004 I.CJ. 3, U 3-5 (Jan. 30).
304: See id.; see also supra Section II.B.l.
305. Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 2004 I.CJ. 3, U 2-5 (Jan. 30).
306. Id. U 2-3.
307. Id. 'lI 8.
308. Id. 'l[ 4.
309. Id. 'l[ 8.
310. Id. 'l[ 4.
311. Id. 'l[ 8.
312. Id. 'lI 7.
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sented on the last point and asserted that although the "formalistic
and narrow" construction of Article 17 (2) had not been violated,
his concern was that the interview created "an appearance of bias"
that required the court to preclude Judge Elaraby's participation in
the proceedings. 313
Regardless of the outcome in any specific case, it would be preferable for the ICJ to adopt a clear standard of review that is in line
with other international courts and tribunals, and namely that
applies a more explicit "appearance-of-bias" test, as assessed by a
reasonable third party. 314 As demonstrated above, there is a consensus among essentially all international courts and tribunals that
a standard requiring a reasonable doubt, as assessed by a third
party, is an acceptable and correct standard to be used in challenge
procedures in international courts and tribunals. While challenges
at the ICJ remain rare occurrences, if the court is faced by one
such case it would benefit the standing and legitimacy of the court
to issue a reasoned opinion based on a clearly articulated standard.
Indeed, while an analysis of the factual circumstances surrounding
the case should take priority, assessing those facts under a reasonable standard would also facilitate an analysis of the decision.
International courts and tribunals are tasked to do much more
today, and their decisions affect an ever-increasing number of people. Adopting a reasonable third-party standard would strengthen
a decision by the court and allow it to be rooted within an existing
theoretical framework. Doing so would also facilitate an understanding of the applicable rules and would be especially important
to strengthen the sociological legitimacy of the court. Moreover, as
the jurisprudence of ICSID analyzed above demonstrates, this step
would not necessarily require a change of the rules, but rather
could be accomplished with a novel reading of the existing applicable procedural rules.
CONCLUSION

The analysis in this Article confirms a certain degree of uniformity among challenge procedures, but also identifies several anomalies pertaining to who decides the challenge and the standard to be
313. See id. 'II 13 (Buergenthal, J., dissenting); see also supra Section 11.B.l.
314. See generally Dame Rosalyn Higgins, What International Courts (and judges) May and
May Not Do, U.N. ComFICATION DIVISION, LEGAL AFFAIRS, http:/ /legal.un.org/avl/ls/Higgins_CT_video_l.html [https://perma.cc/63BB-ALRA] (last visited Oct. 21, 2016)
(explaining that each court has various rules and case law but that there should still be
standards as to what courts and judges may and may not do).
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adopted. It concludes that a best practice has developed, which
calls for challenge decisions made by an external or semi-external
body using a justifiable standard as assessed by a reasonable third
party.31s
Robust challenge and recusal procedures for judges and arbitrators in international courts and tribunals are fundamental to guarantee the legitimacy and effectiveness of international courts and
tribunals. Continuing changes in this direction will also ensure
that judges and arbitrators are and continue to be seen as independent adjudicators.

315. See Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 9, at 285 (" [W] e suggest that it is both possible
and desirable to identify certain common core guidelines for judicial independence applicable to all international judges, regardless of the tribunal on which they sit. Indeed close
scrutiny of existing relevant rules, guidelines, and practices may reveal that agreement on
these core criteria already exists.").

256
APPENDIX
Court or
Tribunal
ICJ

ICSID

1:

SUMMARY OF CHALLENGE PROCEDURES

Who Decides
To Whom to File the
When to
Reauest
Submit
To the president of the
No deadline Members of
the court
ICJ confidentially in
writing; the president can
also act sua sponte if
there is some special
reason; 316 the judge can
also recuse him/herself

To the secretary general

UNCITRAL Directly to the other
party, the arbitrator who
is challenged, and to the
other arbitrators

316.
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"Promptly"
and in any
case before
the
proceeding
is declared
closed

Fifteen days
after the
party has
been
notified of
the
appointment
of the
arbitrator or
within
fifteen days
after
learning of
the
circumstances

ICJ Statute, supra note 36, art. 24.

The
remaining
members of
the tribunal
if only one
arbitrator is
challenged;
the chairman
of the
Administrative
Council if
the
remaining
members are
equally
divided or if
the proposal
refers to the
majority or
sole
arbitrator
If, within
fifteen days
from the
date of the
notice, the
parties have
not agreed
on the
challenge or
the
challenged
arbitrator has
not
withdrawn,
the oartv

Reasons for Proposal
ICJ Statute Articles 16
and 17: Judges exercising
political or administrative
function, or acting as
agent, counsel or
advocate in any case
(only (or elected
members of the court),
past participation in a
case as agent, counsel, or
advocate for one of the
parties, or as a member
of a national or
international court, or
commission of enquiry,
or in any other capacity
(both for elected and ad
hoc iud12:es\
ICSID Convention Article
57: On account of any
fact indicating a manifest
lack of the qualities
required to be
nominated

UNCITRAL Rules
(2010), Article 12(1):
Any arbitrator may be
challenged if
circumstances exist that
give rise to justifiable
doubts as to the
arbitrator's impartiality
or independence.
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making the
challenge
may pursue
the challenge
by seeking,
within thirty
days from
the date of
the challenge
notice, a
decision on
the challenge
from the
appointing
authoritv.
Rule 34(2): "Made in
As soon as
The absolute ICC Statute Article 41:
majority of lJudges should not
writing as soon as there
there is
participate in any case in
is knowledge of the
knowledge
the judges
which his or her
grounds on which it is
of the
impartiality might be
based. The request shall grounds on
reasonably be doubted
state the grounds and
which the
on any ground. Rule 34
attach any relevant
challenge is
grounds include
evidence, and shall be
based
"personal interest in the
transmitted to the person
case, including any
concerned, who shall be
person or professional
entitled to present
relationship with any
written submissions."
other parties,
involvement in his/her
private capacity in any
legal proceedings
involving the accused,
performance of functions
prior to taking office
during which he/she
could be expected to
have formed an opinion
on the case in question
on the parties or their
legal representatives that
'objectively, could
adversely affect the
required impartiality of
the person concentered'
and expression of
opinions 'through the
communication of media,
in writing or in public
actions, that objectively,
could adversely affect the
required impartiality of
the nerson concerned."'
IC1Y Statute Rule 15(B):
Not
The
To the presiding judge
If necessary, following
presiding
of the chamber
specified
the report of the
judge first
confers with presiding judge, the
the judge in president may appoint a
question. If panel of three judges
from other chambers to
necessary,
following the report to him its decision
reoort of the on the merits of the
giving rise
to the
challenge

ICC

ICTY
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ICTR

To the presiding judge
of the chamber

Not
specified

presiding
judge, the
president
may appoint
a panel of
three judges
from other
chambers to
report to him
its decision
on the merits
of the
aoolication.
The
presiding
judge first
confers with
the judge in
question.
The Bureau
(composed
of the
president,
the vicepresident
and the
presiding
judge of the
Trial
Chambers) if
necessary,
shall
determine
the matter.

[Vol. 49
application. A judge may
not sit at a trial or appeal
in any case in which he
has a personal interest or
concerning which he has
or has had any
association which might
affect his impartiality.

ICTR Statute Rule 15: A
judge may not sit at a
trial or appeal in any
case in which he has a
personal interest or
concerning which he has
or has had any
association which might
affect his impartiality.

